A tri-stage stochastic resilience-oriented expansion planning of a smart distribution network under cyber-physical attacks considering IRP mitigation strategy

Abstract

Cyber-physical attacks (CPAs) pose a major challenge to the stability and cybersecurity of power systems. To tackle this issue this paper addresses a tri-stage stochastic framework for cyber-physical attack resilient expansion planning for a smart distribution network (SDNEP^CPAR) that supplies active microgrids (AMGs). The main contribution of this paper is to provide an integrated framework for expansion planning based on improving the resiliency of the electrical network against CPAs. Therefore, this paper investigates the impact of a false data injection attack on the AMGs’ electricity transactions, separately and as part of a broader group of attacks including load redistribution and physical attacks that can affect the operability of the distribution network. This framework employs an integrated resource planning mitigation strategy, including demand response programs, network reconfiguration, and rescheduling of resources to reduce the impact of attacks. In the initial stage, the network structure, the locations of the devices, their capacities and installation time, and the optimal transactions of the AMGs are determined, considering uncertain parameter scenarios. In the subsequent stage, the optimal CPA vector and the resiliency index are determined to maximize the operational cost while adhering to attack constraints. In the final stage, the optimal integrated resource planning mitigation strategy is determined to increase the power system’s resiliency. Numerical simulations are performed using the 33-bus and 123-bus IEEE test systems. Studies reveal the effectiveness of the proposed framework for the expansion planning of the smart distribution network and its resiliency enhancement in the presence of CPAs.