On the relationship between recognition judgments and truth judgments: Memory states moderate the recognition-based truth effect.

IF 2.2 2区 心理学 Q2 PSYCHOLOGY
Lena Nadarevic, Edgar Erdfelder
{"title":"On the relationship between recognition judgments and truth judgments: Memory states moderate the recognition-based truth effect.","authors":"Lena Nadarevic, Edgar Erdfelder","doi":"10.1037/xlm0001460","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Repeatedly seen or heard statements are typically judged to be more likely true than statements not encountered before, a phenomenon referred to as truth effect. Similarly, statements judged to be old typically receive higher truth judgments than statements judged to be new. However, it is unclear whether and how this recognition-based truth effect depends on the latent memory states underlying observed recognition judgments. In order to investigate this question, we used a model-based approach to compare truth judgments as a function of recognition judgments (\"old\" vs. \"new\") and their underlying memory states (state of memory certainty vs. state of uncertainty). In three experiments, we observed a recognition-based truth effect and found this effect to be larger in the state of memory certainty than in the state of uncertainty. This result also replicated for subjective instead of modeled memory states. Moreover, we found effects of recognition judgments on judged truth to be stronger than effects of factual repetition in all three experiments. Taken together, our research highlights the role of episodic memory processes in the truth effect and provides a methodological tool that takes underlying memory states into account. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA, all rights reserved).</p>","PeriodicalId":50194,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Experimental Psychology-Learning Memory and Cognition","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.2000,"publicationDate":"2025-02-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Experimental Psychology-Learning Memory and Cognition","FirstCategoryId":"102","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1037/xlm0001460","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"PSYCHOLOGY","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

Abstract

Repeatedly seen or heard statements are typically judged to be more likely true than statements not encountered before, a phenomenon referred to as truth effect. Similarly, statements judged to be old typically receive higher truth judgments than statements judged to be new. However, it is unclear whether and how this recognition-based truth effect depends on the latent memory states underlying observed recognition judgments. In order to investigate this question, we used a model-based approach to compare truth judgments as a function of recognition judgments ("old" vs. "new") and their underlying memory states (state of memory certainty vs. state of uncertainty). In three experiments, we observed a recognition-based truth effect and found this effect to be larger in the state of memory certainty than in the state of uncertainty. This result also replicated for subjective instead of modeled memory states. Moreover, we found effects of recognition judgments on judged truth to be stronger than effects of factual repetition in all three experiments. Taken together, our research highlights the role of episodic memory processes in the truth effect and provides a methodological tool that takes underlying memory states into account. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA, all rights reserved).

认知判断与真实判断的关系:记忆状态调节认知的真实效应。
反复看到或听到的陈述通常被认为比以前没有遇到过的陈述更有可能是真实的,这种现象被称为真理效应。同样,被判断为旧的陈述通常比被判断为新的陈述得到更高的真值判断。然而,目前尚不清楚这种基于识别的真相效应是否以及如何取决于观察到的识别判断的潜在记忆状态。为了研究这个问题,我们使用了一种基于模型的方法来比较真实判断作为识别判断的函数(“旧”与“旧”)。“新”)和它们的底层记忆状态(记忆确定性状态和不确定性状态)。在三个实验中,我们观察到基于认知的真相效应,并且发现这种效应在记忆确定性状态下比在记忆不确定性状态下更大。这一结果同样适用于主观记忆状态,而不是模拟记忆状态。此外,我们发现在所有三个实验中,识别判断对判断真理的影响比事实重复的影响更强。综上所述,我们的研究强调了情景记忆过程在真相效应中的作用,并提供了一种考虑潜在记忆状态的方法论工具。(PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA,版权所有)。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 求助全文
来源期刊
CiteScore
4.30
自引率
3.80%
发文量
163
审稿时长
4-8 weeks
期刊介绍: The Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition publishes studies on perception, control of action, perceptual aspects of language processing, and related cognitive processes.
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信