The Benefits and Costs of Employee Stock Ownership Plans in China

IF 5.5 3区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS
Qing He, Dongming Jiang, Erzhuo Liu
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

Research Issue

We investigate the deliberations of controlling shareholders in assessing the trade-offs between costs and benefits preceding the adoption of an Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP). Furthermore, we explore the market responses to ESOP announcements and their associations with the private benefits of control. Moreover, our study delves into the modifications in private benefits of control, changes in employment dynamics, and subsequent operating performance subsequent to the implementation of ESOPs.

Research Insights

We conduct our research employing a comprehensive dataset encompassing the adoptions of ESOPs within publicly listed Chinese companies during the period spanning from 2014 to 2020. Our empirical findings reveal that firms characterized by diminished private benefits of control, as indicated by a reduced wedge between control rights and cash flow rights, as well as a lower frequency of related party transactions, are more inclined to consider the adoption of ESOPs, especially when the potential for productivity gains is substantial. These firms also elicit more positive market reactions upon the announcement of their ESOP initiatives. While ESOPs do lead to heightened productivity, the overall enhancement in operating performance remains relatively modest due to the significant cost burden imposed on shareholders by the large unearned employee compensation. Our results suggest that controlling shareholders who partake in fewer private benefits of control are more inclined to forego these entitlements in favor of embracing ESOPs as a strategic mechanism for realizing productivity gains. However, it is imperative to acknowledge that such gains may be considerably offset by substantial increases in employee compensation expenses. Despite the prevalence of short-lived features in Chinese practice, we lack substantial evidence supporting their inhibitory effects on the increased monitoring and productivity following ESOP adoption.

Academic Implications

This study provides a comprehensive examination of recent ESOPs in the Chinese context, offering insights into the regulatory complexities within the largest emerging market. The research contributes to the existing literature by unveiling the intricate relationship between private benefits of control and the decision to adopt ESOPs, as well as their subsequent implications. Notably, our findings, particularly the observed neutral impact on operating performance, augment the ongoing discourse surrounding the efficacy of ESOPs in augmenting shareholder value.

Policy Implications

This research introduces ESOPs as an innovative mechanism for mitigating private benefits of control, particularly in the context of emerging markets where controlling shareholders tend to accrue significant private benefits of control. The incorporation of performance-related criteria within the ESOP framework serves as a means to effectively manage the additional compensation associated with these plans, thereby enhancing their overall efficacy.

中国员工持股计划的收益与成本
研究问题我们调查了控股股东在采用员工持股计划(ESOP)之前评估成本和收益之间权衡的审议。此外,我们探讨了市场对ESOP公告的反应及其与控制的私人利益的联系。此外,我们的研究还深入探讨了实施员工持股计划后私人控制权利益的变化、就业动态的变化以及随后的经营绩效。我们的研究采用了一个全面的数据集,涵盖了2014年至2020年期间中国上市公司员工持股计划的实施情况。我们的实证研究结果表明,控制权和现金流权之间的差距缩小,以及关联方交易频率较低,这些公司的控制私人利益减少,更倾向于考虑采用员工持股计划,尤其是在生产率提高潜力巨大的情况下。这些公司在宣布其员工持股计划后也会引起更积极的市场反应。虽然员工持股计划确实提高了生产率,但由于大量非无偿员工薪酬给股东带来了沉重的成本负担,运营业绩的整体提升仍然相对温和。我们的研究结果表明,参与较少私人控制利益的控股股东更倾向于放弃这些权利,而倾向于将员工持股计划作为实现生产率提高的战略机制。然而,必须承认,这些收益可能会被员工薪酬支出的大幅增加所抵消。尽管短期特征在中国实践中普遍存在,但我们缺乏大量证据支持它们对采用员工持股计划后提高监管和生产率的抑制作用。本研究对中国背景下的员工持股计划进行了全面考察,为了解这个最大的新兴市场的监管复杂性提供了见解。该研究通过揭示控制权的私人利益与采用员工持股计划的决定之间的复杂关系,以及它们随后的影响,为现有文献做出了贡献。值得注意的是,我们的研究结果,特别是观察到的对经营业绩的中性影响,增强了围绕esop在增加股东价值方面功效的持续讨论。本研究将员工持股计划作为一种创新机制引入,以减轻控制权带来的私人利益,特别是在新兴市场的背景下,在这些市场中,控股股东往往会积累大量的控制权带来的私人利益。在员工持股计划框架内纳入与业绩有关的标准是有效管理与这些计划有关的额外报酬的一种手段,从而提高其总体效力。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
7.00
自引率
11.30%
发文量
79
期刊介绍: The mission of Corporate Governance: An International Review is to publish cutting-edge international business research on the phenomena of comparative corporate governance throughout the global economy. Our ultimate goal is a rigorous and relevant global theory of corporate governance. We define corporate governance broadly as the exercise of power over corporate entities so as to increase the value provided to the organization"s various stakeholders, as well as making those stakeholders accountable for acting responsibly with regard to the protection, generation, and distribution of wealth invested in the firm. Because of this broad conceptualization, a wide variety of academic disciplines can contribute to our understanding.
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