The Impact of Mandatory Operating Information Disclosure on Related-Party Transactions: Evidence From China

IF 5.5 3区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS
Yan He, Jing Wang, Qingxi Meng
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

Research Question/Issue

We investigate the impact of mandatory operating information disclosure rules on related-party transactions (RPTs) in Chinese-listed firms. To achieve this, we use the staggered implementation of China's Industry Disclosure Guidelines (CIDG) as an exogenous shock to firms' operating information. We then examine how this regulatory change influences controlling shareholders' expropriation behavior through RPTs.

Research Findings/Insights

The implementation of CIDG results in a reduction in suspicious RPTs, indicating that the mandatory disclosure of operating information effectively mitigates expropriation behavior by controlling shareholders. Additionally, we observe improvements in both the quantity and quality of disclosures after the CIDG, which enhances corporate governance by increasing investor attention and improving the efficiency of regulatory inquiries into RPTs. In our cross-sectional analysis, the impact of the CIDG is more pronounced for firms with weaker internal controls, lower institutional holdings, and a weaker institutional environment as compared to their counterparts, suggesting a “substitution effect” between the CIDG and firms' internal and external governance mechanisms.

Theoretical/Academic Implications

This study contributes to addressing the challenge of curbing opportunistic RPTs in emerging markets. Our study contributes to previous research by emphasizing the crucial role of operating information. This information enhances outsiders' ability to comprehensively understand and utilize disclosed numbers, thereby compensating for a firm's weak corporate governance and restraining expropriation by controlling shareholders. We also provide evidence that corporate governance can be strengthened by improving operational transparency. Our study also contributes to the literature on the actual effect of information on managerial behavior.

Practitioner/Policy Implications

This study has several important policy implications. Providing sufficient operating information to minority shareholders and other monitors can empower them to oversee controlling shareholders' behavior effectively. Policymakers can enhance market discipline by reforming information disclosure rules and promoting industry-level transparency, particularly in emerging markets that have insufficient investor protection against tunneling.

强制性经营信息披露对关联方交易的影响:来自中国的证据
本文研究了强制性经营信息披露制度对中国上市公司关联交易的影响。为了实现这一目标,我们使用中国行业披露指南(CIDG)的交错实施作为企业经营信息的外生冲击。然后,我们通过RPTs研究了这种监管变化如何影响控股股东的征用行为。研究结果/见解CIDG的实施导致可疑rpt的减少,表明强制披露经营信息有效地减轻了控股股东的侵占行为。此外,我们观察到CIDG之后披露的数量和质量都有所改善,这通过增加投资者的关注和提高对rpt的监管调查的效率来加强公司治理。在我们的横断面分析中,与其他公司相比,CIDG对内部控制较弱、机构持股较少、制度环境较弱的公司的影响更为明显,这表明CIDG与公司内部和外部治理机制之间存在“替代效应”。理论/学术意义本研究有助于解决新兴市场中抑制机会主义rpt的挑战。我们的研究强调了操作信息的关键作用,对前人的研究有一定的贡献。这些信息增强了外部人士全面理解和利用披露数据的能力,从而弥补了公司治理的薄弱,抑制了控股股东的侵占。我们还提供了证据,证明可以通过提高运营透明度来加强公司治理。我们的研究也为研究信息对管理行为的实际影响的文献做出了贡献。实践者/政策启示这项研究有几个重要的政策启示。向中小股东和其他监督人员提供充分的经营信息,可以增强他们对控股股东行为的有效监督能力。政策制定者可以通过改革信息披露规则和提高行业层面的透明度来加强市场纪律,尤其是在投资者缺乏防范挖地道保护的新兴市场。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
7.00
自引率
11.30%
发文量
79
期刊介绍: The mission of Corporate Governance: An International Review is to publish cutting-edge international business research on the phenomena of comparative corporate governance throughout the global economy. Our ultimate goal is a rigorous and relevant global theory of corporate governance. We define corporate governance broadly as the exercise of power over corporate entities so as to increase the value provided to the organization"s various stakeholders, as well as making those stakeholders accountable for acting responsibly with regard to the protection, generation, and distribution of wealth invested in the firm. Because of this broad conceptualization, a wide variety of academic disciplines can contribute to our understanding.
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