ESG Ratings and Dividend Changes: Evidence From the Initiation of Nonfinancial Agency Coverage

IF 4.6 3区管理学 Q1 BUSINESS

Corporate Governance-An International Review Pub Date : 2024-09-13 DOI:10.1111/corg.12615

Albert Tsang, Yujie Wang, Yi Xiang, Li Yu

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引用次数: 0

Abstract

Research Question/IssueThis paper examines whether the coverage of nonfinancial rating (NFR) agencies affects corporate dividend policy.Research Findings/InsightsWe argue that dividend payout may decrease (increase) if NFR agencies provide information that reduces (increases) shareholder–manager agency (shareholder–stakeholder) conflict. We find that the coverage by an NFR agency is followed by an increase in dividends. This result is more pronounced for firms with more influential shareholders, poorer financial performance, and greater ESG commitment. We corroborate our findings using the acquisitions of NFR agencies and the expansion of NFR agencies' coverage as two main exogenous shocks. Lastly, our results hold for both US firms and non‐US firms.Theoretical/Academic ImplicationsCollectively, this paper supports that the ESG ratings made available by NFR rating agencies following their rating coverage increase shareholder–stakeholder conflict to a greater extent than its effect on reducing shareholder–managers agency conflict.Practitioner/Policy ImplicationsOur paper delivers critical insights to regulators striving to comprehend the functions of NFR agencies within the capital market more effectively. Such an understanding can further support their efforts to formulate new guidelines suitable for the burgeoning and swiftly evolving industry of NFR agencies.

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ESG 评级与股息变化：非财务机构覆盖的启动证据

研究结果/见解我们认为，如果非财务评级机构提供的信息能够减少（增加）股东-经理机构（股东-利益相关者）之间的冲突，那么股息支付可能会减少（增加）。我们发现，国家财务报告机构提供信息后，股息会随之增加。对于股东影响力更大、财务业绩更差、ESG 承诺更多的公司，这一结果更为明显。我们将收购 NFR 机构和扩大 NFR 机构的覆盖范围作为两个主要的外生冲击来证实我们的研究结果。最后，我们的结果同时适用于美国公司和非美国公司。理论/学术启示总体而言，本文支持 NFR 评级机构在覆盖评级范围后提供的 ESG 评级会在更大程度上增加股东与股东之间的冲突，而不是减少股东与管理者之间的机构冲突。这种理解可以进一步支持监管机构制定新的指导方针，以适应快速发展的 NFR 机构行业。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Corporate Governance-An International Review Multiple-

CiteScore

7.00

自引率

11.30%

发文量

期刊介绍： The mission of Corporate Governance: An International Review is to publish cutting-edge international business research on the phenomena of comparative corporate governance throughout the global economy. Our ultimate goal is a rigorous and relevant global theory of corporate governance. We define corporate governance broadly as the exercise of power over corporate entities so as to increase the value provided to the organization"s various stakeholders, as well as making those stakeholders accountable for acting responsibly with regard to the protection, generation, and distribution of wealth invested in the firm. Because of this broad conceptualization, a wide variety of academic disciplines can contribute to our understanding.