Perceiving secondary qualities

IF 1.1 1区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY
Boyd Millar
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

Thomas Reid famously claimed that our perceptual experiences reveal what primary qualities are in themselves, while providing us with only an obscure notion of secondary qualities. I maintain that this claim is largely correct and that, consequently, any adequate theory of perception must explain the fact that perceptual experiences provide significantly less insight into the nature of secondary qualities than into the nature of primary qualities. I maintain that neither naïve realism nor the standard Russellian variety of the content view can provide a satisfying explanation; instead, in order to provide a satisfying explanation, we must posit that perceptual experiences represent properties via Fregean modes of presentation. Further, I maintain that we must depart from the standard Fregean variety of the content view in two important respects. First, the relevant modes of presentation must be characterized without appealing to causal relations between perceptual experiences and perceived properties; and second, we must posit that primary and secondary qualities are represented via modes of presentation of different kinds. The resulting view is that primary qualities are represented via perceptual modes of presentation analogous to highly detailed descriptions, while secondary qualities are represented via perceptual modes of presentation analogous to impoverished descriptions.

感知次要品质
托马斯-里德(Thomas Reid)有一句名言:我们的知觉经验揭示了主要品质本身是什么,而对次要品质却只提供了一个模糊的概念。我认为这种说法大体上是正确的,因此,任何适当的知觉理论都必须解释这样一个事实,即知觉经验对次要品质性质的揭示远远少于对主要品质性质的揭示。我认为,无论是天真的现实主义还是标准的罗素式的内容观都无法提供令人满意的解释;相反,为了提供令人满意的解释,我们必须假定知觉经验是通过弗雷格的呈现方式来表征属性的。此外,我认为我们必须在两个重要方面背离标准的弗雷格内容观。首先,必须在不诉诸知觉经验与感知属性之间因果关系的情况下描述相关的呈现模式;其次,我们必须假设主要品质和次要品质是通过不同类型的呈现模式来表征的。由此得出的观点是,主要品质是通过类似于高度详细描述的知觉呈现模式来表现的,而次要品质则是通过类似于贫乏描述的知觉呈现模式来表现的。
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来源期刊
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES PHILOSOPHY-
CiteScore
2.60
自引率
7.70%
发文量
127
期刊介绍: Philosophical Studies was founded in 1950 by Herbert Feigl and Wilfrid Sellars to provide a periodical dedicated to work in analytic philosophy. The journal remains devoted to the publication of papers in exclusively analytic philosophy. Papers applying formal techniques to philosophical problems are welcome. The principal aim is to publish articles that are models of clarity and precision in dealing with significant philosophical issues. It is intended that readers of the journal will be kept abreast of the central issues and problems of contemporary analytic philosophy. Double-blind review procedure The journal follows a double-blind reviewing procedure. Authors are therefore requested to place their name and affiliation on a separate page. Self-identifying citations and references in the article text should either be avoided or left blank when manuscripts are first submitted. Authors are responsible for reinserting self-identifying citations and references when manuscripts are prepared for final submission.
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