The optimal product-line selling mode in online platforms

Abstract

The burgeoning success of online retailing has prompted numerous manufacturers to sell their product lines through digital platforms. Despite this trend, the optimal product-line selling mode for both manufacturers and online platforms remains ambiguous. This study aims to address this uncertainty by developing an analytical model. In this model, a manufacturer offers a product line consisting of two quality-differentiated products. Concurrently, an e-tailer (online platform) provides both the first-party and third-party modes, catering to consumers with heterogeneous preferences for product quality. The analysis reveals that when the high-quality product's quality level is sufficiently low, the manufacturer achieves maximum profit by wholesaling the high-quality product with the first-party mode but directly selling the low-quality product via the third-party mode; otherwise, the manufacturer maximizes profit by directly selling both products via the third-party mode. For the e-tailer, when the high-quality product's quality level is moderate, he can gain the highest profit by encouraging the manufacturer to wholesale both products with the first-party mode. However, when the high-quality product's quality level is sufficiently low (high), the e-tailer can obtain the highest profit under the case where the manufacturer sells the high-quality product via the third-party (first-party) mode but distributes the low-quality product with the first-party (third-party) mode. The intuition lies in the competition dynamics and the double marginalization effect under different selling modes.