Board gender diversity and cash holding: the effect of family ties

IF 7.8 3区 管理学 Q1 MANAGEMENT
Gema del C. Fleitas-Castillo, Jerónimo Pérez-Alemán, Domingo Javier Santana-Martín
{"title":"Board gender diversity and cash holding: the effect of family ties","authors":"Gema del C. Fleitas-Castillo, Jerónimo Pérez-Alemán, Domingo Javier Santana-Martín","doi":"10.1007/s11846-024-00788-4","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>Using a sample of 630 firm-year observations of non-financial Spanish listed companies for the period 2004–2020, this study examines linkages of family and non-family female directors and cash holding. We show that family and non-family female directors affect cash holdings differently. When the presence of family female directors is scarce, their role is eclipsed, thereby encouraging actions related to family goals and increasing cash holdings. However, when the presence of family female directors reaches a critical mass, the cohesion between the interests of the dominant family and external investors increases, thereby reducing the level of cash holdings. When the number of non-family female directors is low, the cash level of family firms is reduced, suggesting that non-family female directors encourage the family firm’s cash reduction as a result of their greater capacity to control and their orientation towards an effective corporate governance system. This cash-decreasing effect will occur even if the number of non-family female directors is low, since the purpose of appointing non-family female directors is less likely to be symbolic. In addition, non-family female directors are concerned about threats to reputational capital, such that reducing cash holdings would promote their reputation as credible supervisors, protect their current appointments, and also boost the likelihood of future appointments. However, the presence of a critical mass of non-family female directors becomes a sufficiently powerful instrument of control and legitimation for external investors, allowing for increased cash levels without increasing agency conflicts.</p>","PeriodicalId":20992,"journal":{"name":"Review of Managerial Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":7.8000,"publicationDate":"2024-07-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Review of Managerial Science","FirstCategoryId":"91","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11846-024-00788-4","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"MANAGEMENT","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

Abstract

Using a sample of 630 firm-year observations of non-financial Spanish listed companies for the period 2004–2020, this study examines linkages of family and non-family female directors and cash holding. We show that family and non-family female directors affect cash holdings differently. When the presence of family female directors is scarce, their role is eclipsed, thereby encouraging actions related to family goals and increasing cash holdings. However, when the presence of family female directors reaches a critical mass, the cohesion between the interests of the dominant family and external investors increases, thereby reducing the level of cash holdings. When the number of non-family female directors is low, the cash level of family firms is reduced, suggesting that non-family female directors encourage the family firm’s cash reduction as a result of their greater capacity to control and their orientation towards an effective corporate governance system. This cash-decreasing effect will occur even if the number of non-family female directors is low, since the purpose of appointing non-family female directors is less likely to be symbolic. In addition, non-family female directors are concerned about threats to reputational capital, such that reducing cash holdings would promote their reputation as credible supervisors, protect their current appointments, and also boost the likelihood of future appointments. However, the presence of a critical mass of non-family female directors becomes a sufficiently powerful instrument of control and legitimation for external investors, allowing for increased cash levels without increasing agency conflicts.

Abstract Image

董事会性别多样性与现金持有:家庭关系的影响
本研究以 2004-2020 年间西班牙非金融类上市公司的 630 个公司年度观测数据为样本,考察了家族和非家族女性董事与现金持有量之间的联系。我们发现,家族和非家族女性董事对现金持有量的影响不同。当家族女董事人数稀少时,她们的作用就会黯然失色,从而鼓励与家族目标相关的行动,增加现金持有量。然而,当家族女性董事的数量达到临界值时,主导家族与外部投资者之间的利益凝聚力就会增强,从而降低现金持有水平。当非家族女性董事人数较少时,家族企业的现金水平会降低,这表明非家族女性董事由于其更强的控制能力和对有效公司治理制度的导向而鼓励家族企业减少现金。即使非家族女性董事的人数较少,这种现金减少效应也会出现,因为任命非家族女性董事的目的不太可能是象征性的。此外,非家族女性董事还担心声誉资本受到威胁,因此减少现金持有量会提高她们作为可信监督者的声誉,保护她们目前的任命,也会提高未来任命的可能性。然而,对于外部投资者来说,非家族女性董事临界数量的存在已成为一个足够强大的控制和合法化工具,允许在不增加代理冲突的情况下增加现金水平。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 求助全文
来源期刊
CiteScore
11.30
自引率
14.50%
发文量
86
期刊介绍: Review of Managerial Science (RMS) provides a forum for innovative research from all scientific areas of business administration. The journal publishes original research of high quality and is open to various methodological approaches (analytical modeling, empirical research, experimental work, methodological reasoning etc.). The scope of RMS encompasses – but is not limited to – accounting, auditing, banking, business strategy, corporate governance, entrepreneurship, financial structure and capital markets, health economics, human resources management, information systems, innovation management, insurance, marketing, organization, production and logistics, risk management and taxation. RMS also encourages the submission of papers combining ideas and/or approaches from different areas in an innovative way. Review papers presenting the state of the art of a research area and pointing out new directions for further research are also welcome. The scientific standards of RMS are guaranteed by a rigorous, double-blind peer review process with ad hoc referees and the journal´s internationally composed editorial board.
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信