What does nihilism tell us about modal logic?

IF 1.1 1区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY
Christopher James Masterman
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

Brauer (Philos Stud 179:2751–2763, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-022-01793-7, 2022) has recently argued that if it is possible that there is nothing, then the correct modal logic for metaphysical modality cannot include D. Here, I argue that Brauer’s argument is unsuccessful; or at the very least significantly weaker than presented. First, I outline a simple argument for why it is not possible that there is nothing. I note that this argument has a well-known solution involving the distinction between truth in and truth at a possible world. However, I then argue that once the semantics presupposed by Brauer’s argument is reformulated in terms of truth at a world, we have good reasons to think that a crucial semantic premise in Brauer’s argument should be rejected in favour of an alternative. Brauer’s argument is, however, no longer valid with this alternative premise. Thus, plausibly Brauer’s argument against D is only valid, if it is not sound.

虚无主义对模态逻辑有何启示?
布劳尔(Philos Stud 179:2751-2763,https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-022-01793-7, 2022)最近提出,如果 "无 "是可能的,那么形而上学模态的正确模态逻辑就不能包括 "D"。在此,我认为布劳尔的论证是不成功的;或者至少比他提出的论证要弱得多。首先,我概述了一个简单的论证,说明为什么 "无 "是不可能的。我注意到,这个论证有一个众所周知的解决方案,涉及可能世界中的真理与可能世界中的真理之间的区别。然而,我接着论证说,一旦布劳尔的论证所预设的语义学被重新表述为 "在一个世界中的真理",我们就有充分的理由认为,布劳尔论证中的一个关键语义学前提应该被摒弃,转而采用另一种选择。然而,有了这个替代前提,布劳尔的论证就不再有效了。因此,布劳尔反对 D 的论证只有在不健全的情况下才是有效的。
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来源期刊
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES PHILOSOPHY-
CiteScore
2.60
自引率
7.70%
发文量
127
期刊介绍: Philosophical Studies was founded in 1950 by Herbert Feigl and Wilfrid Sellars to provide a periodical dedicated to work in analytic philosophy. The journal remains devoted to the publication of papers in exclusively analytic philosophy. Papers applying formal techniques to philosophical problems are welcome. The principal aim is to publish articles that are models of clarity and precision in dealing with significant philosophical issues. It is intended that readers of the journal will be kept abreast of the central issues and problems of contemporary analytic philosophy. Double-blind review procedure The journal follows a double-blind reviewing procedure. Authors are therefore requested to place their name and affiliation on a separate page. Self-identifying citations and references in the article text should either be avoided or left blank when manuscripts are first submitted. Authors are responsible for reinserting self-identifying citations and references when manuscripts are prepared for final submission.
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