The inferential constraint and if $$\varvec{\phi }$$ ought $$\varvec{\phi }$$ problem

IF 1.1 1区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY
Una Stojnić
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Abstract

The standard semantics for modality, together with the influential restrictor analysis of conditionals (Kratzer, 1986, 2012) renders conditional ought claims like “If John’s stealing, he ought to be stealing” trivially true. While this might seem like a problem specifically for the restrictor analysis, the issue is far more general. Any account must predict that modals in the consequent of a conditional sometimes receive obligatorily unrestricted interpretation, as in the example above, but sometimes appear restricted, as in, e.g., “If John’s speeding, he ought to pay the fine.” And the problem runs deeper, for there are non-conditional variants of the data. Thus, the solution cannot lie in adopting a particular analysis of conditionals, nor a specific account of the interaction between conditionals and modals. Indeed, with minimal assumptions, the standard account of modality will render a myriad of claims about what one ought to, must, or may, do trivially true. Worse, the problem extends to a wide range of non-deontic modalities, including metaphysical modality. But the disaster has a remedy. I argue that the source of the problem for the standard account lies in its failure to capture an inferential evidence constraint encoded in the meaning of a wide range of modal constructions. I offer an account that captures this constraint, and show it provides a general and independently motivated solution to the problem.

Abstract Image

推理约束和如果 $$\varvec{\phi }$ 应该 $$\varvec{\phi }$ 的问题
模态的标准语义以及对条件的有影响力的限制条件分析(Kratzer, 1986, 2012)使得 "如果约翰在偷窃,他就应该在偷窃 "这样的条件应然断言变得微不足道。虽然这似乎是限制语分析的一个具体问题,但这个问题要普遍得多。任何解释都必须预言,条件后件中的模态有时会得到强制性的无限制解释,如上面的例子,但有时也会出现限制解释,如 "如果约翰超速行驶,他就应该交罚款"。"而且问题更深层次,因为数据存在非条件变体。因此,解决的办法不能在于对条件式进行特定的分析,也不能在于对条件式和模态式之间的相互作用进行特定的解释。事实上,只要有最低限度的假设,关于模态的标准解释就会使无数关于一个人应该做什么、必须做什么或可以做什么的主张变得微不足道。更糟糕的是,这个问题还扩展到一系列非deontic模态,包括形而上学模态。但是,这场灾难是有补救办法的。我认为,标准解释的问题根源在于它未能捕捉到广泛的模态结构意义中所包含的推论证据约束。我提出了一种能够捕捉到这种约束的解释,并证明它为这一问题提供了一种普遍的、有独立动机的解决方案。
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来源期刊
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES PHILOSOPHY-
CiteScore
2.60
自引率
7.70%
发文量
127
期刊介绍: Philosophical Studies was founded in 1950 by Herbert Feigl and Wilfrid Sellars to provide a periodical dedicated to work in analytic philosophy. The journal remains devoted to the publication of papers in exclusively analytic philosophy. Papers applying formal techniques to philosophical problems are welcome. The principal aim is to publish articles that are models of clarity and precision in dealing with significant philosophical issues. It is intended that readers of the journal will be kept abreast of the central issues and problems of contemporary analytic philosophy. Double-blind review procedure The journal follows a double-blind reviewing procedure. Authors are therefore requested to place their name and affiliation on a separate page. Self-identifying citations and references in the article text should either be avoided or left blank when manuscripts are first submitted. Authors are responsible for reinserting self-identifying citations and references when manuscripts are prepared for final submission.
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