Meritocracy, meritocratic education, and equality of opportunity

IF 1.3 Q2 EDUCATION & EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH
Toby Napoletano
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Abstract

There are two ways, broadly speaking, that one might conceive of meritocratic education. On a standard, ‘narrow’ conception, a meritocratic approach to education is one which distributes certain educational goods and opportunities according to merit. On a second, ‘broader’ conception, however, meritocratic education is an educational system suited to a commitment to meritocracy – where ‘meritocracy’ refers to a particular conception of distributive justice. In this article, I argue that these two conceptions are incompatible with each other, and so the standard ‘narrow’ conception of meritocratic education is, in fact, incompatible with a commitment to meritocracy, at least given the typical way of understanding meritocracy. Of particular importance is that while meritocracy, as a view of distributive justice, requires a commitment to equality of opportunity principles, the narrowly meritocratic conception of education does not. The reason has to do with differences in the underlying justifications of the merit-based principles in each: Meritocracy appeals to moral desert, while the educational desert that is grounded by one’s merits is best thought of as a kind of institutional desert. Thus, I will argue, while meritocracy (and so the broad conception of meritocratic education) is constrained by a fair equality of opportunity requirement, narrowly meritocratic education is not. Recognizing the relationships between meritocracy, meritocratic education, and equality of opportunity, I argue, sheds considerable light on disagreements in the debate over equality of opportunity in education.
任人唯贤、任人唯贤的教育和机会均等
从广义上讲,我们可以从两个方面来理解功利主义教育。从标准的、"狭义 "的概念上讲,功利主义教育是一种按照功绩分配某些教育产品和机会的教育方法。然而,从第二种 "更广泛 "的概念来看,功利主义教育是一种适合于功利主义承诺的教育制度--这里的 "功利主义 "指的是一种特定的分配正义概念。在本文中,我将论证这两种概念是互不相容的,因此标准的 "狭义 "功利主义教育概念事实上与功利主义的承诺是互不相容的,至少从功利主义的典型理解方式来看是如此。尤为重要的是,作为一种分配正义的观点,任人唯贤要求对机会均等原则做出承诺,而狭义的任人唯贤教育观则不然。究其原因,这与各自基于择优原则的基本理由不同有关:功利主义诉诸道德荒漠,而以个人功绩为基础的教育荒漠最好被视为一种制度荒漠。因此,我将论证,虽然任人唯贤(以及广义的任人唯贤的教育概念)受到机会公平平等要求的制约,但狭义的任人唯贤的教育则不然。我认为,认识到任人唯贤、任人唯贤的教育和机会均等之间的关系,可以大大揭示教育机会均等争论中的分歧。
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来源期刊
Theory and Research in Education
Theory and Research in Education EDUCATION & EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH-
CiteScore
2.00
自引率
0.00%
发文量
22
期刊介绍: Theory and Research in Education, formerly known as The School Field, is an international peer reviewed journal that publishes theoretical, empirical and conjectural papers contributing to the development of educational theory, policy and practice.
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