Differential Game Model for a Dual-Channel Supply Chain’s Optimal Strategy under the Reference Carbon Emission Effect

IF 1.7 4区 工程技术 Q2 MATHEMATICS, INTERDISCIPLINARY APPLICATIONS
Complexity Pub Date : 2024-01-29 DOI:10.1155/2024/5824693
Di Yu
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Abstract

Taking into account the impact of time factors on emission reductions and brand reputation, the reference carbon emission effect and dual-channel supply chain are incorporated into a unified analysis framework. We applied differential game theory to build models under centralized decision-making and decentralized decision-making. The aim of the research is to explore the strategies of a single manufacturer and a single retailer on product pricing, low-carbon production, and advertising. The research analyses the impact of reference carbon emission effects, cost coefficients, and interchannel substitutable coefficients on profits. In order to alleviate the double marginal effect brought about by decentralized decision-making, a cost-compensation coordination mechanism is proposed. The conclusions are as follows. First, centralized decision-making is the optimal decision-making mode, but further consultation is required to implement it voluntarily by both parties. Second, a cost-recovery contract occurs when the fixed fee that the retailer gives the manufacturer meets certain conditions. The contract can make the retailer’s advertising investment reach the level of centralized decision-making and improve the member’s profit under the decentralized decision-making. The coordination mechanism is effective. Third, the reference carbon emission effect can bring about an increase in the manufacturer’s low-carbon production input and profits. The retailer’s advertising investment is not affected by the reference carbon emission effect. Fourth, wholesale prices and online or offline retail prices are all positively correlated with the market share of the channel. The price-substitution coefficient between channels is positively correlated with both low-carbon inputs and profits.

参考碳排放效应下双通道供应链最优策略的差异博弈模型
考虑到时间因素对减排量和品牌声誉的影响,将参考碳排放效应和双渠道供应链纳入统一的分析框架。我们运用微分博弈论建立了集中决策和分散决策下的模型。研究的目的是探讨单一制造商和单一零售商在产品定价、低碳生产和广告方面的策略。研究分析了参考碳排放效应、成本系数和渠道间可替代系数对利润的影响。为了缓解分散决策带来的双重边际效应,提出了一种成本补偿协调机制。结论如下。第一,集中决策是最优决策模式,但需要双方进一步协商,自愿执行。其次,当零售商给予制造商的固定费用满足一定条件时,就会产生成本回收合同。该合同可以使零售商的广告投入达到集中决策的水平,提高分散决策下成员的利润。协调机制是有效的。第三,参考碳排放效应可以带来制造商低碳生产投入和利润的增加。零售商的广告投入不受参考碳排放效应的影响。第四,批发价格、线上或线下零售价格都与渠道的市场份额正相关。渠道间的价格替代系数与低碳投入和利润均呈正相关。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
Complexity
Complexity 综合性期刊-数学跨学科应用
CiteScore
5.80
自引率
4.30%
发文量
595
审稿时长
>12 weeks
期刊介绍: Complexity is a cross-disciplinary journal focusing on the rapidly expanding science of complex adaptive systems. The purpose of the journal is to advance the science of complexity. Articles may deal with such methodological themes as chaos, genetic algorithms, cellular automata, neural networks, and evolutionary game theory. Papers treating applications in any area of natural science or human endeavor are welcome, and especially encouraged are papers integrating conceptual themes and applications that cross traditional disciplinary boundaries. Complexity is not meant to serve as a forum for speculation and vague analogies between words like “chaos,” “self-organization,” and “emergence” that are often used in completely different ways in science and in daily life.
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