Converting a drug from off-label to on-label use: Government subsidies and patient welfare

IF 2.8 4区 管理学 Q2 MANAGEMENT
Wendy Olsder, Tugce Martagan, Christopher S. Tang
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Abstract

Most rare diseases have no approved treatments available, and doctors often prescribe existing drugs for “off-label” use in the sense that a drug is prescribed for a medical condition that is different from the original condition approved by regulatory authorities. To develop approved treatments for rare diseases quickly without starting from scratch, governments have introduced different subsidy programs to entice pharmaceutical companies to exert extra efforts to “convert” certain drugs from off-label to “on-label” use. However, the impact of this subsidized conversion strategy on patient welfare remains unclear because both efficacy and price can change once a drug is converted from off-label to on-label use. This paper represents an initial attempt to investigate the effectiveness of different types of government subsidies (e.g., offer subsidies to manufacturers, patients, or both) for improving patient welfare through the drug conversion strategy. We present a three-stage Stackelberg game-theoretic model that captures the interactions among the government, manufacturer, and patients, and determine whether it is optimal to subsidize the manufacturer, patients, or both. We identify requisite (market and subsidy) conditions for a manufacturer to convert a drug from off-label to on-label use. We also determine the optimal extra development effort to convert an off-label drug, and the optimal unit selling price for the on-label drug after conversion. Contrary to the generally held public opinions, our analysis reveals that subsidizing pharmaceutical manufacturers is more effective than subsidizing patients. This result implies that subsidies offered to manufacturers would incentivize higher conversion efforts, and subsequently increase the expected patient welfare. Furthermore, we show that this result continues to hold even when the patients are risk-averse or on-label market size is uncertain. Our numerical analysis on the drugs Aralen, Humira, Revlimid, and Zostex reveals that government subsidies are necessary for enticing conversion from off-label to on-label use.

Abstract Image

将药物从说明书外使用转化为说明书内使用:政府补贴和患者福利
大多数罕见疾病都没有得到批准的治疗方法,医生经常把现有药物开给“标签外”使用,也就是说,这种药物是针对一种不同于监管机构批准的原始疾病的医疗状况开出的。为了不从零开始,迅速开发出经批准的罕见病治疗方法,各国政府推出了不同的补贴计划,以吸引制药公司付出额外的努力,将某些药物从标签外“转化”为标签内使用。然而,这种补贴转换策略对患者福利的影响尚不清楚,因为一旦药物从说明书外使用转换为说明书内使用,疗效和价格都可能发生变化。本文代表了对不同类型的政府补贴(例如,向制造商、患者或两者提供补贴)通过药物转换策略改善患者福利的有效性的初步尝试。我们提出了一个三阶段的Stackelberg博弈论模型,该模型捕捉了政府、制造商和患者之间的相互作用,并确定是否补贴制造商、患者或两者都是最优的。我们确定了制造商将药物从说明书外使用转换为说明书内使用的必要(市场和补贴)条件。我们还确定了转换标签外药物的最佳额外开发努力,以及转换后标签内药物的最佳单位销售价格。与公众普遍持有的观点相反,我们的分析表明,补贴制药企业比补贴患者更有效。这一结果表明,向制造商提供补贴将激励更高的转换努力,并随后增加预期的患者福利。此外,我们表明,即使在患者厌恶风险或标签上的市场规模不确定的情况下,这一结果仍然成立。我们对Aralen、Humira、Revlimid和Zostex等药物的数值分析表明,政府补贴对于诱导非说明书用药转为说明书用药是必要的。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
DECISION SCIENCES
DECISION SCIENCES MANAGEMENT-
CiteScore
12.40
自引率
1.80%
发文量
34
期刊介绍: Decision Sciences, a premier journal of the Decision Sciences Institute, publishes scholarly research about decision making within the boundaries of an organization, as well as decisions involving inter-firm coordination. The journal promotes research advancing decision making at the interfaces of business functions and organizational boundaries. The journal also seeks articles extending established lines of work assuming the results of the research have the potential to substantially impact either decision making theory or industry practice. Ground-breaking research articles that enhance managerial understanding of decision making processes and stimulate further research in multi-disciplinary domains are particularly encouraged.
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