{"title":"Selective Conscientious Objection and the Prima Facie Duty Override Criteria","authors":"Logan Sisson","doi":"10.1080/15027570.2023.2264069","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTSelective conscientious objection, a refusal to participate in a specific war due to reasons of conscience, has recently gained attention. A combatant confronted with such a decision needs guidance to help decide whether and how to object. Furthermore, those judging a combatant’s objection or failure to object need guidance. After introducing the prima facie duty override criteria, I will apply the criteria to the case of selective conscientious objection. Ultimately, I argue that the jus ad bellum criteria rebranded as the prima facie duty override criteria can help provide guidance regarding selective conscientious objection.KEYWORDS: Selective conscientious objectionprima facie dutiesjus ad bellumaggressive war AcknowledgementThe majority of this came from my 2016 PhD Dissertation at the University of Virginia. Specifically, I would like to thank Tal Brewer and James Childress. I also thank those who provided me feedback at the 2018 International Society of Military Ethics (ISME). Specifically, I would like to thank Martin Cook. Additionally, I would like to thank the reviewers and editors of the Journal of Military Ethics for their feedback. Finally, the views expressed in this work are solely my own, and do not express an official viewpoint of the Air Force or Department of Defense.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.Notes1 I assume the reader is already familiar with these and will not spend time discussing them. There are many variations, but I do not think the lack of a consensus lessens my overall point. I have taken my ordering from Brian Orend, but have divided “public declaration by proper authority” into two components (Citation2013, 34).Additional informationNotes on contributorsLogan SissonLogan Sisson (PhD, University of Virginia, 2016) is an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the US Air Force Academy. His research interests include just war theory, ethics, moral injury, and human rights.","PeriodicalId":39180,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Military Ethics","volume":"87 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2023-10-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Military Ethics","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1080/15027570.2023.2264069","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"Arts and Humanities","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
ABSTRACTSelective conscientious objection, a refusal to participate in a specific war due to reasons of conscience, has recently gained attention. A combatant confronted with such a decision needs guidance to help decide whether and how to object. Furthermore, those judging a combatant’s objection or failure to object need guidance. After introducing the prima facie duty override criteria, I will apply the criteria to the case of selective conscientious objection. Ultimately, I argue that the jus ad bellum criteria rebranded as the prima facie duty override criteria can help provide guidance regarding selective conscientious objection.KEYWORDS: Selective conscientious objectionprima facie dutiesjus ad bellumaggressive war AcknowledgementThe majority of this came from my 2016 PhD Dissertation at the University of Virginia. Specifically, I would like to thank Tal Brewer and James Childress. I also thank those who provided me feedback at the 2018 International Society of Military Ethics (ISME). Specifically, I would like to thank Martin Cook. Additionally, I would like to thank the reviewers and editors of the Journal of Military Ethics for their feedback. Finally, the views expressed in this work are solely my own, and do not express an official viewpoint of the Air Force or Department of Defense.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.Notes1 I assume the reader is already familiar with these and will not spend time discussing them. There are many variations, but I do not think the lack of a consensus lessens my overall point. I have taken my ordering from Brian Orend, but have divided “public declaration by proper authority” into two components (Citation2013, 34).Additional informationNotes on contributorsLogan SissonLogan Sisson (PhD, University of Virginia, 2016) is an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the US Air Force Academy. His research interests include just war theory, ethics, moral injury, and human rights.