K. Järvinen, Céline Blondeau, D. Page, Michael Tunstall
{"title":"Harnessing Biased Faults in Attacks on ECC-Based Signature Schemes","authors":"K. Järvinen, Céline Blondeau, D. Page, Michael Tunstall","doi":"10.1109/FDTC.2012.13","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This paper presents an extension of the byte-fault attack on signature schemes presented by Giraud et al. Our work extends their attack in a number of ways, but the main focus is an alternative fault model motivated by existing fault injection results. Instead of assuming faults are uniformly distributed (i.e., a given bit is flipped with probability 1/2), we consider the case where faults are biased (i.e., the probability differs from 1/2). Our results show that injecting biased faults allows an attacker to reveal security-critical data with significantly fewer faults and/or a significantly faster search through the remaining candidates.","PeriodicalId":165647,"journal":{"name":"2012 Workshop on Fault Diagnosis and Tolerance in Cryptography","volume":"80 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2012-09-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"10","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2012 Workshop on Fault Diagnosis and Tolerance in Cryptography","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/FDTC.2012.13","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 10
Abstract
This paper presents an extension of the byte-fault attack on signature schemes presented by Giraud et al. Our work extends their attack in a number of ways, but the main focus is an alternative fault model motivated by existing fault injection results. Instead of assuming faults are uniformly distributed (i.e., a given bit is flipped with probability 1/2), we consider the case where faults are biased (i.e., the probability differs from 1/2). Our results show that injecting biased faults allows an attacker to reveal security-critical data with significantly fewer faults and/or a significantly faster search through the remaining candidates.