Leveraging DRAM Refresh to Protect the Memory Timing Channel of Cloud Chip Multi-processors

Abstract

The shared memory controllers of single-chip cloud computing (SCC) processors are vulnerable to timing-channel attacks. Existing protection strategies based on fixed memory bandwidth assignment degrade processor performance and severely harm the experience of cloud-users. This paper proposes a novel light-weight timing channel protection scheme against both side channel and covert channel attacks to the shared memory controllers of cloud chip multi-processors (CMPs). Instead of enforcing a fixed time-slot assignment to the applications, we go an entirely different technical route and utilize the background DRAM refresh as a free noise source to eliminate the time correlation between victim and attacker applications. The proposed protection framework, MemJam, relies on the emerging fine-grained refresh technology to achieve the effects of timing channel obfuscation. Multi-programmed workloads running in a cloud CMP were used to evaluate the protection method. The results show that the light-weight refresh-based noise can effectively block the timing-channel between user applications, and achieve up to 1.61~2.49X memory performance boost compared to prior solutions.