{"title":"爱与人权。","authors":"Benedict Douglas","doi":"10.1093/ojls/gqac034","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>This article explains and critiques the protection of love within judgments concerning relationships under the Human Rights Act 1998. Using theory of emotion to conduct doctrinal analysis of the protection of love within international human rights laws and under the Human Rights Act 1998, it reveals a shift in the conception of love underlying the domestic judicial application of huamn rights. Whereas previously the law was underpinned by values of duty and property, judgments concerning relationships now protect the capacity of individuals to choose how to live. However, the protection of this modern conception of love is limited by judicial deference, allowing the values underpinning the historical conception of love to continue to influence the law.</p>","PeriodicalId":47225,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Journal of Legal Studies","volume":"43 2","pages":"273-297"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4000,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10243926/pdf/","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Love and Human Rights.\",\"authors\":\"Benedict Douglas\",\"doi\":\"10.1093/ojls/gqac034\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p><p>This article explains and critiques the protection of love within judgments concerning relationships under the Human Rights Act 1998. Using theory of emotion to conduct doctrinal analysis of the protection of love within international human rights laws and under the Human Rights Act 1998, it reveals a shift in the conception of love underlying the domestic judicial application of huamn rights. Whereas previously the law was underpinned by values of duty and property, judgments concerning relationships now protect the capacity of individuals to choose how to live. However, the protection of this modern conception of love is limited by judicial deference, allowing the values underpinning the historical conception of love to continue to influence the law.</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":47225,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Oxford Journal of Legal Studies\",\"volume\":\"43 2\",\"pages\":\"273-297\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.4000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-01-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10243926/pdf/\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Oxford Journal of Legal Studies\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"90\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1093/ojls/gqac034\",\"RegionNum\":2,\"RegionCategory\":\"社会学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"LAW\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Oxford Journal of Legal Studies","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/ojls/gqac034","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"LAW","Score":null,"Total":0}
This article explains and critiques the protection of love within judgments concerning relationships under the Human Rights Act 1998. Using theory of emotion to conduct doctrinal analysis of the protection of love within international human rights laws and under the Human Rights Act 1998, it reveals a shift in the conception of love underlying the domestic judicial application of huamn rights. Whereas previously the law was underpinned by values of duty and property, judgments concerning relationships now protect the capacity of individuals to choose how to live. However, the protection of this modern conception of love is limited by judicial deference, allowing the values underpinning the historical conception of love to continue to influence the law.
期刊介绍：
The Oxford Journal of Legal Studies is published on behalf of the Faculty of Law in the University of Oxford. It is designed to encourage interest in all matters relating to law, with an emphasis on matters of theory and on broad issues arising from the relationship of law to other disciplines. No topic of legal interest is excluded from consideration. In addition to traditional questions of legal interest, the following are all within the purview of the journal: comparative and international law, the law of the European Community, legal history and philosophy, and interdisciplinary material in areas of relevance.
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