M. Kabir Hassan , Reza Houston , M.Sydul Karim , Ahmed Sabit
{"title":"2020年冠状病毒疫情期间首席执行官的二元性和公司业绩","authors":"M. Kabir Hassan , Reza Houston , M.Sydul Karim , Ahmed Sabit","doi":"10.1016/j.jeca.2022.e00278","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Stewardship theory suggests that CEO duality can provide strong leadership and facilitate the development and coordination of firm strategy. These benefits should affect firm risk and financial performance, particularly when the firm has high information-gathering costs. We use the 2020 coronavirus outbreak as a natural experiment to determine whether CEO duality is beneficial during crisis periods. We find that in 2020, S&P 1500 firms with CEO duality exhibit smaller increases in default probability risk than firms with non-duality in the presence of high information costs. Firms with CEO duality experience a smaller decrease in profitability when information costs are high. We also find that firms with CEO duality offer cumulative abnormal returns significantly higher than those of other firms. CEO duality is more valuable in firms with higher information costs. Our results indicate that CEO duality is valuable during crisis periods, particularly when information costs are high. These results are consistent with stewardship theory and indicate that the concentration of power from CEO duality is beneficial during crisis periods.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":38259,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Asymmetries","volume":"27 ","pages":"Article e00278"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2023-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9633622/pdf/","citationCount":"3","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"CEO duality and firm performance during the 2020 coronavirus outbreak\",\"authors\":\"M. Kabir Hassan , Reza Houston , M.Sydul Karim , Ahmed Sabit\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.jeca.2022.e00278\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><p>Stewardship theory suggests that CEO duality can provide strong leadership and facilitate the development and coordination of firm strategy. These benefits should affect firm risk and financial performance, particularly when the firm has high information-gathering costs. We use the 2020 coronavirus outbreak as a natural experiment to determine whether CEO duality is beneficial during crisis periods. We find that in 2020, S&P 1500 firms with CEO duality exhibit smaller increases in default probability risk than firms with non-duality in the presence of high information costs. Firms with CEO duality experience a smaller decrease in profitability when information costs are high. We also find that firms with CEO duality offer cumulative abnormal returns significantly higher than those of other firms. CEO duality is more valuable in firms with higher information costs. Our results indicate that CEO duality is valuable during crisis periods, particularly when information costs are high. These results are consistent with stewardship theory and indicate that the concentration of power from CEO duality is beneficial during crisis periods.</p></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":38259,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Economic Asymmetries\",\"volume\":\"27 \",\"pages\":\"Article e00278\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-06-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9633622/pdf/\",\"citationCount\":\"3\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Economic Asymmetries\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S170349492200038X\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"Economics, Econometrics and Finance\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Economic Asymmetries","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S170349492200038X","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"Economics, Econometrics and Finance","Score":null,"Total":0}
CEO duality and firm performance during the 2020 coronavirus outbreak
Stewardship theory suggests that CEO duality can provide strong leadership and facilitate the development and coordination of firm strategy. These benefits should affect firm risk and financial performance, particularly when the firm has high information-gathering costs. We use the 2020 coronavirus outbreak as a natural experiment to determine whether CEO duality is beneficial during crisis periods. We find that in 2020, S&P 1500 firms with CEO duality exhibit smaller increases in default probability risk than firms with non-duality in the presence of high information costs. Firms with CEO duality experience a smaller decrease in profitability when information costs are high. We also find that firms with CEO duality offer cumulative abnormal returns significantly higher than those of other firms. CEO duality is more valuable in firms with higher information costs. Our results indicate that CEO duality is valuable during crisis periods, particularly when information costs are high. These results are consistent with stewardship theory and indicate that the concentration of power from CEO duality is beneficial during crisis periods.
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