奥地利模式:社会伙伴关系作为抑制利润率下降的手段

Julia M. Puaschunder
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引用次数: 1

摘要

经济危机是所有市场体系所固有的。从长期繁荣到长期低迷的飞跃是由于缺乏发达资本主义经济体来实现和维持高利润率。经济历史学家以意大利、法国、德国和日本为例,生动地描述了导致利润缩水的过度积累和经济过热是大繁荣、大衰退和大萧条的根本原因。过度积累的基础是资本账户因劳动力需求而减少,这导致工资上涨和资本外逃,最终导致经济无利可图。在长期繁荣阶段,紧缩的劳动力市场最终会导致阶级冲突,这是利润挤压的起点,最终会导致泡沫破裂、衰退和萧条。过热发生在罢工浪潮和随后的工资爆炸之后,例如1968年至1970年在欧洲的法国、德国、荷兰、意大利和英国,工人们以罢工行动来支持他们的要求。资本家被迫承认工资上涨,这最终降低了他们的利润率。罢工源于对实际工资增长放缓、劳动力份额减少和利润份额增加、工资差距缩小和工作量增加的不满。过去的国际例子描述了多种传统的货币、财政和社会干预策略,这些策略是避免繁荣和萧条的反周期手段。本文旨在增加现有文献描述奥地利社会伙伴关系的情况。奥地利实践的这种利益相关者参与方式被证明可以避免导致经济效率低下的工人起义、抗议和罢工的社会不平衡。自第二次世界大战后以来,奥地利的经济奇迹归功于社会伙伴关系在奥地利社会稳定的同时促进了经济增长。奥地利经济的经济波动相对较低,其基础是通过自决、参与和妥协巧妙地解决阶级斗争和工人权利运动的社会伙伴关系模式。奥地利独特的自愿社会伙伴模式被用来含蓄地抑制利润率下降的现象。在社会合伙制模式中,在许多其他国家破坏利润率的公民,获得了参加董事会讨论国家主张的机会。与部分非法的、适得其反的、危险的罢工运动不同,社会伙伴关系在政府、政党和劳动、社会和经济政策领域的某些利益集团之间形成了一种制度化的关系。虽然自二战结束以来,社会伙伴关系被广泛认为是奥地利政治的一个关键因素,但它既没有扎根于奥地利宪法,也没有在任何具体的法律行为中规定。讨论了从奥地利经济增长结构方式中获得的见解,同时提出了社会伙伴关系作为在经济波动之后避免消极后果的手段的国际和未来观点。虽然从欧洲联盟一体化的角度来看,在全球化时代,社会伙伴关系的影响可能正在减弱,但利益攸关方参与方式相对不太发达的其他国家可以从奥地利优雅的社会伙伴方式的积极例子中学习,共同实现经济、工业和社会努力。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
The Austrian Way: Sozialpartnerschaft as Means to Curb the Falling Rate of Profit
Economic crises are inherent in all market systems. The leap from long boom to long downturn is attributed to the lack of advanced capitalist economies to achieve and sustain high profit rates. Economic historians vividly outline overaccumulation and overheating leading to a squeeze of profits as underlying to great booms, recessions and depressions by the historical examples of Italy, France, Germany and Japan. Overaccumulation is based on the capital account being run down due to a demand for labor, which leads to rising wages and capital flight and ultimately to unprofitable economies. Tightening labor markets during long boom phases lead eventually to class conflict, which is the starting point of the profit squeeze and eventually busts and recessions and depressions. Overheating occurs in the wake of strike waves and subsequent wage explosions, such as in Europe between 1968 and 1970 in France, Germany, Netherlands, Italy and the United Kingdom, when workers backed their claims with strike action. Capitalists were forced to concede wage rises, which eventually lowered their rate of profit. Strikes stem out of frustration over moderation of growth of real wages, reduction in labor's share and increase in the share of profits, erosion of differentials, and increased work load. Manifold conventional monetary, fiscal and social intervention strategies as counter-cyclical means to avert booms and busts are described in international examples of the past. This paper aims at adding to the existing literature the case of describing the Austrian Sozialpartnerschaft. This stakeholder engagement means practiced in Austria is shown to avert social imbalances leading to economically inefficient worker uprising, protests and strikes. Since the post-World War II era, the Austrian Wirtschaftswunder (economic miracle) is attributed to the Sozialpartnerschaft breeding economic growth alongside social stability in Austria. The relative low economic fluctuations of the Austrian economy are grounded in the model of Sozialpartnerschaft to solve class struggles and worker rights movements elegantly through self-determination, participation and compromise. The unique Austrian model of the voluntary Sozialpartnerschaft is captured to implicitly curb the falling rate of profit phenomenon. In the Sozialpartnerschaft model, the citizenry, that undermines the profit rate in many other countries, gains access to board meetings to discuss national claims. Rather than partially illegal and counterproductive, risky strike movements, the Sozialpartnerschaft forms an institutionalized relationship between the government, political parties and certain interest groups in the field of labor, social, and economic policy. While it is widely recognized as a key element in Austrian politics since the end of World War II, social partnership is neither anchored in the Austrian constitution nor laid down in any specific legal act. The insights gained from the Austrian way to structure economic growth are discussed alongside granting an international and future perspective of Sozialpartnerschaft as means to avert negative consequences in the wake of economic fluctuations. While the influence of the Sozialpartnerschaft may be decreasing in the eye of the European Union integration and in times of globalization, other countries with fairly less developed stakeholder engagement approaches may learn from the positive example of the Austrian way to gracefully social partner in reaching common economic, industrial and societal endeavors together.
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