中央资助计划的设计要素:对中央-州基金转移可变性的解释

M. Phadke
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引用次数: 0

摘要

各邦通过财政委员会(FC)、(以前的)计划委员会和管理中央部门(CS)和中央赞助计划(CSS)的中央部委接受中央的转移支付。虽然FC转移支付基本上是公式化的,但中央部委的转移支付不是通过公式确定的,仍然是“酌情”的。向各邦的自由裁量转移支付,与中央联合政府的存在同时发生,在学术文献中引发了一场关于政治考虑是否会影响印度自由裁量转移支付的辩论。然而,数据发现并不是结论性的。我们提出了另一种观点,即基于方案的传输的固有设计元素如何在传输到不同状态时产生差异。以印度的两个主要方案为例,我们试图找出可能导致州一级转移差异的设计层面的刚性。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Design Elements of Centrally Sponsored Schemes: An Explanation for Variability in Centre-State Fund Transfers
States receive transfers from the centre through the Finance Commission (FC), (erstwhile) Planning Commission and from the central ministries which run the central sector (CS) and centrally sponsored schemes (CSS). While FC transfers are largely formulaic, transfers by central ministries are not determined through a formula and have remained “discretionary”. Discretionary transfers to states, co-incident with the presence of coalition governments at the centre, have led to a debate in academic literature about whether political considerations may affect discretionary transfers in India. However, the data findings have not been conclusive. We present an alternative view of how the inherent design elements of scheme-based transfers can create differentials in the transfers to different states. Using the examples of two major schemes in India, we attempt to identify design level rigidities that could potentially lead to differences in state-level transfers.
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