{"title":"两阶段供应链中的stackelberg博弈模型","authors":"Yanhong Qin","doi":"10.1016/j.sepro.2011.11.029","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We set a stackelberg-game model of full postponement strategy in a two-stage supply chain made up of one manufacture and one distributor in the first place. We study the impact of decision variables, i.e. customization service price and promised customization time of distributor, final customized product price and promised delivery time of manufacture on the profit of manufacturer and distributor for industrial engineering.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":101207,"journal":{"name":"Systems Engineering Procedia","volume":"3 ","pages":"Pages 268-274"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2012-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1016/j.sepro.2011.11.029","citationCount":"11","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"A stackelberg-game model in a two-stage supply chain\",\"authors\":\"Yanhong Qin\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.sepro.2011.11.029\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><p>We set a stackelberg-game model of full postponement strategy in a two-stage supply chain made up of one manufacture and one distributor in the first place. We study the impact of decision variables, i.e. customization service price and promised customization time of distributor, final customized product price and promised delivery time of manufacture on the profit of manufacturer and distributor for industrial engineering.</p></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":101207,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Systems Engineering Procedia\",\"volume\":\"3 \",\"pages\":\"Pages 268-274\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2012-01-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1016/j.sepro.2011.11.029\",\"citationCount\":\"11\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Systems Engineering Procedia\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2211381911001822\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Systems Engineering Procedia","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2211381911001822","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
A stackelberg-game model in a two-stage supply chain
We set a stackelberg-game model of full postponement strategy in a two-stage supply chain made up of one manufacture and one distributor in the first place. We study the impact of decision variables, i.e. customization service price and promised customization time of distributor, final customized product price and promised delivery time of manufacture on the profit of manufacturer and distributor for industrial engineering.
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