解释理论分歧

IF 1.9 2区 社会学 Q1 LAW
B. Leiter
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引用次数: 49

摘要

夏皮罗(2007)最近指出,德沃金在《法律帝国》中对法律实证主义提出了一种新的反对意见,他说,实证主义者没有对此作出充分的回应。反对意见认为,实证主义者对德沃金所说的关于法律的“理论分歧”没有令人满意的解释,也就是说,对“法律依据”或实证主义者所说的法律有效性标准的分歧。我同意夏皮罗的观点,认为这种批评是新的,但不同意这种批评没有得到满足。实证主义无法提供一种保留理论分歧的“表面价值”的解释,因为关于法律有效性标准的唯一可理解的争议是经验或“人数”争议,即关于法官在做什么以及他们中有多少人在做这件事的争议(因为根据实证主义,是官员的实际实践和他们对实践的态度确定了法律有效性标准)。然而,实证主义对理论分歧有另外两种解释,即“解释”而不是保留“表面价值”分歧。实证主义者认为,理论上的分歧要么是虚伪的,即当事人有意无意地试图改变法律,也就是说,正如德沃金所说,他们试图说“法律应该是什么”,而不是“法律是什么”;或者他们只是错了,也就是说,他们真诚地认为,在他们的分歧背景下,关于法律依据是什么存在一个事实,因此法律是什么,但他们错了,因为事实上,在这种情况下,关于法律依据的事实是不存在的,正是因为在这一点上,官员之间没有统一的行为实践,构成了“承认规则”。“Disingenuity”和“Error Theory”对理论分歧的解释进行了探讨,并关注了在相互竞争的解释理论之间进行选择时的理论需求(例如,简单性、一致性、方法论保守主义)。特别要注意的是,根据判决的实际历史背景和同时代案件中里格斯法官的其他意见,对里格斯诉帕尔默案的最佳解释。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Explaining Theoretical Disagreement
Shapiro (2007) has recently argued that Dworkin posed a new objection to legal positivism in Law's Empire, to which positivists, he says, have not adequately responded. Positivists, the objection goes, have no satisfactory account of what Dworkin calls "theoretical disagreement" about law, that is, disagreement about "the grounds of law" or what positivists would call the criteria of legal validity. I agree with Shapiro that the critique is new, and disagree that it has not been met. Positivism can not offer an explanation that preserves the "face value" of theoretical disagreements, because the only intelligible dispute about the criteria of legal validity is an empirical or "head count" dispute, i.e., a dispute about what judges are doing, and how many of them are doing it (since it is the actual practice of officials and their attitudes towards that practice that fixes the criteria of legal validity according to the positivist). Positivism, however, has two other explanations for theoretical disagreement, which "explain away" rather than preserve the "face value" disagreement. According to positivists, either theoretical disagreements are disingenuous, in the sense that the parties, consciously or unconsciously, are really trying to change the law, that is, they are trying to say, as Dworkin puts it, "what it should be" not "what the law is"; or they are simply in error, that is, they honestly think there is a fact of the matter about what the grounds of law are, and thus what the law is, in the context of their disagreement, but they are mistaken, because, in truth, there is no fact of the matter about the grounds of law in this instance precisely because there is no convergent practice of behavior among officials constituting a Rule of Recognition on this point. The "Disingenuity" and "Error Theory" accounts of theoretical disagreement are explored, with attention to the theoretical desiderata (e.g., simplicity, consilience, methodological conservativism) at stake in choosing between competing explanatory theories. Particular attention is given to the best explanation for Riggs v. Palmer in light of the actual historical context of the decision and other opinions by the Riggs judges in contemporaneous cases.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
2.40
自引率
5.00%
发文量
2
期刊介绍: The University of Chicago Law Review is a quarterly journal of legal scholarship. Often cited in Supreme Court and other court opinions, as well as in other scholarly works, it is among the most influential journals in the field. Students have full responsibility for editing and publishing the Law Review; they also contribute original scholarship of their own. The Law Review"s editorial board selects all pieces for publication and, with the assistance of staff members, performs substantive and technical edits on each of these pieces prior to publication.
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