欧洲公司治理:流动性与控制的权衡

IF 2.8 Q2 BUSINESS

Corporate Communications Pub Date : 1999-05-25 DOI:10.2139/ssrn.160588

Marco Becht

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引用次数: 121

摘要

所有权分散是股票市场流动性的先决条件，但它带来了一个集体行动问题:个人投资者没有动力参与直接监督。法律手段可以从三个方面提供解决方案。第一，他们可以集中或稀释投票权。第二，它们会影响流动性。第三，他们可以给予正确或错误的监督激励。本文展示了这些设备是如何使用的，以及它们如何抑制流动性。旨在加强对少数群体保护的法律限制可能会缩小监测范围，破坏流动性，甚至为滥用少数群体创造动机:例如，一股一票的限制可能会鼓励金字塔控股公司的形成。寻求集中投票权、提供流动性和保护少数群体的解决办法仍在继续。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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European Corporate Governance: Trading Off Liquidity Against Control

Ownership dispersion is a pre-requisite for liquid stock markets, but it entails a collective action problem: individual investors have no incentives to engage in direct monitoring. Legal devices can provide solutions along three dimensions. One, they can concentrate or dilute voting power. Two, they can affect liquidity. Three, they can give the right or wrong monitoring incentives. This paper shows how these devices are used and how they can depress liquidity. Legal constraints aimed at strengthening minority protection can reduce the scope for monitoring, destroy liquidity and even create incentives for minority abuse: for example one-share-one-vote restrictions can encourage the formation of pyramidal holding companies. The search for solutions that concentrate voting power, provide liquidity and protect minorities continues.

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来源期刊

Corporate Communications BUSINESS-

CiteScore

3.90

自引率

20.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： Corporate Communications: An International Journal addresses the issues arising from the increased awareness that an organisation''s communications are part of the whole organisation, and that the relationship an organisation has with its external public requires careful management. The responsibility for communications is increasingly being seen as part of every employee''s role and not simply the function of the marketing/PR departments. This journal will illustrate why communications are important and how best to implement a strategic communications plan.