大骗局——重新评估“大”衰退及其“补救措施”

L. Kotlikoff
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引用次数: 4

摘要

大多数经济学家的分歧,不是在大衰退的原因上,而是在它们的相对重要性上。不过,他们在基本问题上是一致的,即人的失灵,而不是市场失灵。这项研究运用了一些新的,一些旧的证据,来重新尝试通常的怀疑。它认定没有人有罪。相反,它认为由不透明、虚假谣言和恐慌介导的广义多重均衡才是真正的罪魁祸首。银行挤兑有很多模型。但每一种都可能引发解雇风潮——解雇别人的客户,因为担心别人也会解雇你的客户。挤兑反过来又加剧银行挤兑,形成恶性循环。这个周期可以被那些从经济困境中受益的人(卖空者)操纵。如果问题出在银行体系,而不是银行业参与者,那么解决方案肯定在于根本性的银行业改革。本文最后指出,改革转向100%股权融资的共同基金银行,并由政府组织,实时资产核查和披露,可以防止金融挤兑及其引发解雇挤兑的能力。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
The Big Con – Reassessing the "Great" Recession and its "Fix"
Most economists differ, not on the causes of the Great Recession, but on their relative importance. They concur, though, on the basic problem, namely human, not market failure. This study applies the evidence, some new, some old, to re-try the usual suspects. It finds none guilty. Instead, it identifies broadly defined multiple equilibrium, mediated by opacity, false rumors, and panic, as the real culprit. There are many models of bank runs. But each can trigger firing runs – firing someone else’s customers for fear that others are firing your customers. Firing runs, in turn, exacerbate bank runs, producing a vicious cycle. This cycle can be manipulated by those who benefit from economic distress (short sellers). If the banking system, not the banking players is the problem, the solution surely lies in fundamental banking reform. This paper concludes by pointing out that a reform that shifted to 100 percent, equity-financed mutual-fund banking with government-organized, real-time asset verification and disclosure could preclude financial runs and their ability to induce firing runs.
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