The structure of (social) scientific contradictions: a commentary on the problem of paradigmatic behaviour by social scientists

In this commentary I discuss the utility of Thomas Kuhn’s perspectives on ‘paradigms’, the conduct of ‘normal science’ and the nature of scientific progress and debate over time for understanding the conduct of debate in the social sciences (of, in this case, sport). I argue that although the social sciences do not possess the paradigm‐relative structure of the natural sciences, this does not prevent social scientists from acting as though they do. Using the debate on judging research quality in sport in QRSE 1(2) as an illustrative example, I argue that paradigmatic behaviour by social scientists, which casts debates in terms of ‘us’ and ‘them’ can have two consequences. Firstly, because debates are undertaken with the purpose of fully converting ‘them’ (the ‘other’) to ‘our’ point of view, debates do not benefit from the consideration of the implications of ‘others’ critiques for one’s own position. Secondly, rather than engagement in a genuine argument, paradigmatic behaviour can reduce debates to mere contradiction of the position of the ‘other’, with the dismissal of ‘their’ position being justified on the basis that it is derived from an incommensurable paradigm. The implications of such paradigmatic behaviours are that they diminish the quality of debate surrounding difficult issues around the nature of knowledge and science as applied to sport research, and ultimately adversely affect the quality of knowledge that sport research generates.