分离所有权和信息

IF 10.5 1区经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS

American Economic Review Pub Date : 2022-09-01 DOI:10.1257/aer.20211069

P. Voss, Marius Kulms

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引用次数: 2

摘要

本文确定了所有权和控制权分离的一个好处，这通常是公司理论中低效的根源。由于内部人通过行使控制权获得私人信息，所有权和控制权的分离导致所有权和信息的分离。我们表明，这种分离对于公司控制权市场的有效交易是必要的。分析揭示了内外股东之间的战略沟通如何通过引出外部竞购者的私人信息来促进收购。我们的结果对收购期间的强制性披露要求提出了质疑。(凝胶d21, d82, g32, g34)

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Separating Ownership and Information

This paper identifies an upside of the separation of ownership and control, typically the source of inefficiencies in the theory of the firm. Because insiders obtain private information by exercising control, the separation of ownership and control leads to a separation of ownership and information. We show that this separation is necessary for efficient trade in the market for corporate control. The analysis reveals how strategic communication between inside and outside shareholders facilitates takeovers by eliciting external bidders’ private information. Our results call into question mandatory disclosure requirements during takeovers. (JEL D21, D82, G32, G34)

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来源期刊

American Economic Review ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

18.60

自引率

2.80%

发文量

122

期刊介绍： The American Economic Review (AER) stands as a prestigious general-interest economics journal. Founded in 1911, it holds the distinction of being one of the nation's oldest and most esteemed scholarly journals in economics. With a commitment to academic excellence, the AER releases 12 issues annually, featuring articles that span a wide spectrum of economic topics.