竞争与地方政府在非正式与正式合作机制之间的选择:以商业权衡为视角衡量二元城市间竞争

Namhoon Ki
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引用次数: 0

摘要

非正式和正式合作机制是地方政府用来减轻政府间合作风险的独特自治策略。长期以来,关于地方治理的研究一直认为,这两种机制往往是共存的,并且是相辅相成的。然而,现有的基于交易成本视角的研究提供了一个更细致和不同的解释,即随着政府间竞争的加剧,地方政府倾向于选择正式机制而不是非正式机制来有效地应对更高的合作风险。本研究通过网络视角对后一种观点进行了实证检验。以奥兰多大都市区为测试平台,多元回归二次分配程序测试表明,这两种合作机制的使用与政府间竞争水平呈正相关。然而,与最初预期不同的是,随着竞争水平的提高,地方政府更倾向于参与非正式机制而不是正式机制。在此过程中,本研究开发了一种新的政府间竞争测量策略,以检验二元网络相关的研究假设。测量策略和研究结果可为今后政府间关系和地方政府网络管理的研究提供参考。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Competition and Local Government's Choice Between Informal and Formal Collaborative Mechanisms: Measuring Dyadic Intercity Competition Through the Lens of Business Trade-Offs
Informal and formal collaborative mechanisms are distinctive self-governing strategies that local governments use to mitigate intergovernmental collaboration risks. Studies on local governance have long argued that both mechanisms tend to co-occur and appear mutually complementary. However, extant research drawing on the transaction cost perspective provides a more nuanced and different explanation that as intergovernmental competition increases, local governments lean toward the choice of a formal mechanism over an informal mechanism to effectively address higher collaboration risks. Through a network lens, this study empirically tests the latter view. Using the Orlando metropolitan area as a testbed, Multiple Regression Quadratic Assignment Procedure tests reveal that the use of both collaborative mechanisms is positively associated with the level of intergovernmental competition. However, different from the initial expectation, local governments are more likely to engage in the informal mechanism rather than the formal mechanism as the competition level increases. In doing so, this study developed a new measurement strategy for intergovernmental competition to test the dyadic network-related research hypotheses. The measurement strategy and the research findings should inform future research on intergovernmental relations and local government network management.
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