高阶证据与自我定位的动力:基于精度的校准论证》。

IF 0.8 2区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY
ERKENNTNIS Pub Date : 2024-01-01 Epub Date: 2022-08-27 DOI:10.1007/s10670-022-00589-9
Brett Topey
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引用次数: 0

摘要

代理人应该在高阶证据面前校准他们的信念--也就是说,应该在有证据表明这些信念的推理有误时调整他们的一阶信念--这一论点有时被认为与贝叶斯信念更新方法相冲突:据称,为了遵守贝叶斯规范,代理人必须在高阶证据面前保持坚定。但我认为这种说法是不正确的。具体而言,我提出了合理处理自我定位信念随时间演变的最小约束,并证明校准主义与任何尊重这一约束的广义贝叶斯方法都是兼容的。然后,我用这一结果来论证,保持坚定并不是对高阶证据做出最大化预期准确性的回应。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Higher-Order Evidence and the Dynamics of Self-Location: An Accuracy-Based Argument for Calibrationism.

The thesis that agents should calibrate their beliefs in the face of higher-order evidence-i.e., should adjust their first-order beliefs in response to evidence suggesting that the reasoning underlying those beliefs is faulty-is sometimes thought to be in tension with Bayesian approaches to belief update: in order to obey Bayesian norms, it's claimed, agents must remain steadfast in the face of higher-order evidence. But I argue that this claim is incorrect. In particular, I motivate a minimal constraint on a reasonable treatment of the evolution of self-locating beliefs over time and show that calibrationism is compatible with any generalized Bayesian approach that respects this constraint. I then use this result to argue that remaining steadfast isn't the response to higher-order evidence that maximizes expected accuracy.

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来源期刊
ERKENNTNIS
ERKENNTNIS PHILOSOPHY-
CiteScore
2.10
自引率
11.10%
发文量
116
期刊介绍: Erkenntnis is a philosophical journal publishing papers committed in one way or another to the philosophical attitude which is signified by the label ''scientific philosophy''. It concentrates on those philosophical fields which are particularly inspired by this attitude, although other topics are welcome as well. These fields are:- Epistemology - Philosophy of science, foundations and methodology of science in general and of natural and human sciences such as physics, biology, psychology, economics, social sciences in particular - Philosophy of mathematics - Logic, philosophy of logic, and all kinds of philosophical logics - Philosophy of language - Ontology, metaphysics, theory of modality - Philosophical psychology, philosophy of mind, neurophilosophy - Practical philosophy, i.e. ethics, philosophy of action, philosophy of law, etc. One of the objectives of Erkenntnis is the provision of a suitable platform for the discussion of controversial issues; another is the provision of timely, competent reviews of important publications in an ever-growing field of research.In recent years, philosophers standing quite outside the pale of analytic philosophy have also paid careful, and indeed most welcome, attention to precision of concept and language, to arguments, and to well-grounded foundations. Erkenntnis provides for them, and for philosophers of all persuasions, a place of meeting, of discussion, and of disputation.Erkenntnis was originally founded in 1930 by Rudolf Carnap and Hans Reichenbach, it was revived in 1975 by Carl G. Hempel, Wolfang Stegmüller, and Wilhelm K. Essler. You can find more information about this in the article “Hempel: The old and the new ‘Erkenntnis’” accessible in the tabs to the right.Today, Erkenntnis is one of the leading journals in philosophy worldwide and attracts first-class authors at all stages of career; from young philosophers at the PhD level up to established academic philosophers and highly renowned senior scholars. We pride ourselves on supplying our authors with substantial referee reports, subject to a turnaround time of about three months until the first decision. The acceptance rate for publications in the journal is presently slightly below 10%.
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