意识和心智理论:一个共同的理论?

IF 0.8 4区哲学 Q2 HISTORY & PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

THEORIA-REVISTA DE TEORIA HISTORIA Y FUNDAMENTOS DE LA CIENCIA Pub Date : 2016-02-17 DOI:10.1387/THEORIA.14091

M. Sebastián

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引用次数: 0

摘要

许多哲学家和科学家认为，现象意识状态与其他状态的区别在于意识状态所具有的隐性自我意识。高阶表征主义理论试图通过高阶表征来解释这种自我意识。意识依赖于我们表现自己精神状态的能力，意识依赖于我们的心智理论。这种能力至少在概念上可以分解为另外两种:读心术和元认知。在本文中，我将论证意识不能依赖于读心术。因此，HOR理论的站得住脚取决于读心术和元认知之间的关系。我分析了关于这种关系的几种观点，并认为它们似乎都不是HOR理论的合理选择。

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Consciousness and Theory of Mind: a Common Theory?

Many philosophers and scientists have argued that the difference between phenomenally conscious states and other kind of states lies in the implicit self-awareness that conscious states have. Higher-Order Representationalist (HOR) theories, attempt to explain such a self-awareness by means of a higher-order representation. Consciousness relies on our capacity to represent our own mental states, consciousness depends on our Theory of Mind. Such an ability can, at least conceptually, be decomposed into another two: mindreading and metacognition. In this paper I will argue that consciousness cannot depend on mindreading. The tenability of HOR theories depends, therefore, on the relation between mindreading and metacognition. I analyze several views on such a relation and argue that none of them seem to be a plausible option for HOR theories.

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来源期刊

THEORIA-REVISTA DE TEORIA HISTORIA Y FUNDAMENTOS DE LA CIENCIA HISTORY & PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE-

CiteScore

1.30

自引率

16.70%

发文量

审稿时长

7 weeks

期刊介绍： THEORIA is open to original and relevant papers from any of the fields covered by the journal, i.e. logic and philosophy of logic, history and philosophy of mathematics, history and philosophy of science, philosophy of technology, philosophy of language and philosophy of mind and cognition. Articles in English and Spanish are preferred, but the journal also accepts articles written in any of the languages of the Iberian Peninsula.