工作(内)安全和工人培训决策:框架方法

IF 1.5 Q2 EDUCATION & EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH
P. Kamphuis, A. Glebbeek
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引用次数: 1

摘要

背景:在本研究中,我们试图对感知劳动力市场不安全感与工人培训投资之间关系的稀缺证据做出贡献。利用对决策框架的现有研究,我们调查了将劳动力市场定义为不安全是否会增加工人投资培训的意愿。我们还调查了在培训合同条款有利的情况下,比如培训主要在雇主的时间内完成,或者没有包括回报条款时,这种影响是否更大。方法:数据是通过对荷兰高年级学生样本的小插图研究收集的,并对框架进行实验操作。受访者被要求填写一份问卷,在问卷中,他们被要求想象自己在一家虚构的公司工作(但以真实的形式呈现给他们)。安全/不安全框架是通过随机强调与该公司工作人员的劳动力市场地位相关的一系列事件的积极或消极方面来引出的。然后,受访者被要求回答五个小插曲,每个小插曲都是随机生成的培训合同条款组合。对于每个小插曲,受访者被要求说明他们是否愿意在该小插曲中概述的条件下进行指定的培训计划。数据分析采用多水平逻辑回归。研究发现:在不安全的情况下,训练的意愿并不一定更大。相反,我们发现了一个关键的相互作用:在不安全的情况下,培训的意愿更大*通讯作者:pa.j.kamphuis@pl.hanze.nl 362当培训合同条款有利(例如,不包括回报条款)时,工作(In)安全和培训决策框架,但当培训合同条款不利时,培训意愿更小。由于正面和负面影响在大小上大致相等,在像我们这样的平衡设计中,它们相互抵消,导致框架变量的整体效果接近于零。结论:我们的研究结果表明,当员工意识到他们的处境不安全时,这只会让他们在投资损失风险较低的情况下更愿意接受培训。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Job (In)Security and Workers’ Training Decisions: A Framing Approach
Context: In this study, we attempt to contribute to the scarce evidence about the relationship between perceived labour market insecurity and worker training investments. Drawing on existing research into framing in decision-making, we investigate whether framing the labour market as insecure increases the willingness of workers to invest in training. We also investigate whether this effect is larger when training contract terms are favourable, such as when training is done mostly in an employer’s time, or when no payback clause is included. Approach: Data are gathered through a vignette-study under a sample of senior Dutch students, with experimental manipulation of frames. Respondents are given a questionnaire in which they are asked to imagine themselves working for a fictitious firm (but presented to them as real). The security/insecurity frames are elicited by randomly stressing either the positive or negative side of a series of events related to the labour market position of people working in this firm. Respondents are then asked to respond to five vignettes, each of these a randomly generated combination of training contract terms. For each vignette, respondents are asked to state whether or not they would be willing to go along with the specified training program under the conditions outlined in that vignette. Data are analysed with multilevel logistic regression. Findings: The willingness to train is not invariably greater under an insecurity frame. Instead, we find a crucial interaction: the willingness to train is greater under an insecurity *Corresponding author: pa.j.kamphuis@pl.hanze.nl 362 Job (In)Security and Training Decisions frame when training-contract terms are favourable (e.g when no payback clause is included), but smaller when training-contract terms are unfavourable. Since the positive and negative effects are approximately equal in size, in a balanced design such as ours they cancel each other out, resulting in a close to zero overall effect for the frame variable. Conclusion: Our results suggest that, when workers are aware of the insecurity in their situation, this only makes them more willing to follow training when the risk of losing their investment is low.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
2.90
自引率
23.10%
发文量
14
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