{"title":"重复博弈中以牙还牙策略的变形零行列式策略","authors":"M. Ueda","doi":"10.7566/JPSJ.90.025002","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We introduce the concept of deformed zero-determinant strategies in repeated games. We then show that the Tit-for-Tat strategy in the repeated prisoner's dilemma game is a deformed zero-determinant strategy, which unilaterally equalizes the probability distribution functions of payoffs of two players.","PeriodicalId":8442,"journal":{"name":"arXiv: Combinatorics","volume":"23 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2020-12-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"6","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Tit-for-Tat Strategy as a Deformed Zero-Determinant Strategy in Repeated Games\",\"authors\":\"M. Ueda\",\"doi\":\"10.7566/JPSJ.90.025002\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"We introduce the concept of deformed zero-determinant strategies in repeated games. We then show that the Tit-for-Tat strategy in the repeated prisoner's dilemma game is a deformed zero-determinant strategy, which unilaterally equalizes the probability distribution functions of payoffs of two players.\",\"PeriodicalId\":8442,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"arXiv: Combinatorics\",\"volume\":\"23 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2020-12-10\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"6\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"arXiv: Combinatorics\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.7566/JPSJ.90.025002\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"arXiv: Combinatorics","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.7566/JPSJ.90.025002","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Tit-for-Tat Strategy as a Deformed Zero-Determinant Strategy in Repeated Games
We introduce the concept of deformed zero-determinant strategies in repeated games. We then show that the Tit-for-Tat strategy in the repeated prisoner's dilemma game is a deformed zero-determinant strategy, which unilaterally equalizes the probability distribution functions of payoffs of two players.
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：
京公网安备 11010802042870号
