分析师所属机构交易行为的变化:全球分析师研究结算的影响

Q1 Economics, Econometrics and Finance

Financial Markets, Institutions and Instruments Pub Date : 2021-04-24 DOI:10.1111/fmii.12142

Hyoseok (David) Hwang

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引用次数: 3

摘要

本文考察了全球分析师研究结算(GS)对分析师附属机构交易行为的影响。使用有证券集体诉讼的公司，我发现分析师附属机构在他们自己的分析师降级之前减少了他们对被起诉公司的股票持有，这支持了一个先行假设。在GS之后，分析师附属机构的这种抢先交易行为在受制裁机构中有所减少。然而，对于非制裁机构，分析师附属机构的知情交易行为仍然很强，这意味着全球结算不能阻止非制裁机构的抢先交易活动。这项研究表明，需要采取更多的监管行动来防止分析师附属机构的不当行为。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Changes in trading behavior of analyst-affiliated institutions: the impact of the global analyst research settlement

This paper examines the impact of the Global Analyst Research Settlement (GS) on the trading behavior of analyst-affiliated institutions. Using firms with securities class actions, I find that analyst-affiliated institutions reduce their stockholdings of sued firms prior to their own analyst downgrades, which supports a front-running hypothesis. This front-running trading behavior of analyst-affiliated institutions diminishes for sanctioned institutions after the GS. However, the informed trading behavior of the analyst-affiliated institutions remains strong for non-sanctioned institutions, implying that the Global Settlement could not impede non-sanctioned institutions from front-running trading activities. This study suggests more regulatory actions are needed to prevent analyst-affiliated institutions’ misconduct.

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来源期刊

Financial Markets, Institutions and Instruments Economics, Econometrics and Finance-Economics, Econometrics and Finance (all)

CiteScore

1.80

自引率

0.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： Financial Markets, Institutions and Instruments bridges the gap between the academic and professional finance communities. With contributions from leading academics, as well as practitioners from organizations such as the SEC and the Federal Reserve, the journal is equally relevant to both groups. Each issue is devoted to a single topic, which is examined in depth, and a special fifth issue is published annually highlighting the most significant developments in money and banking, derivative securities, corporate finance, and fixed-income securities.