增选董事会是否提高了内部人士的盈利能力?

IF 2.9 3区 管理学 Q2 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Dewan Rahman , Ihtisham Malik , Searat Ali , Jamshed Iqbal
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引用次数: 4

摘要

本文以1996-2014年的美国公司为样本,考察了内部人交易盈利能力是否随着董事会增购权的增加而增加。事实上,我们发现增选董事水平较高的公司表现出更高的内幕交易盈利能力,这主要是由于较低的管理能力和分析师覆盖率。增选董事会也不太可能实施自我强加的内幕交易限制,从而加剧了这种关系。如果机构投资者的外部监督水平提高,以及首席执行官获得更多基于绩效的激励,这种积极联系就会减弱。总的来说,增选董事表现出与首席执行官和公司内部人士的利益一致,而不是扮演监督者的角色。因此,增选董事会与内部人士的剥削行为呈正相关。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Do co-opted boards increase insider profitability?

Using a sample of U.S. firms over the period 1996–2014, this paper examines whether insider trading profitability increases with high board co-option. Indeed, we find that firms with a higher level of co-opted directors exhibit higher insider trading profitability, largely due to a lower level of managerial ability and analyst coverage. Co-opted boards are also unlikely to implement self-imposed insider trading restrictions, exacerbating this relationship. This positive association is mitigated by a higher level of external monitoring by institutional investors and if the CEO receives more performance-based incentives. Overall, co-opted directors demonstrate aligned interests with CEOs and corporate insiders rather than performing their role as monitors. As a result, a more co-opted board is positively associated with exploitative behaviour of insiders.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
6.00
自引率
3.00%
发文量
24
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