Research on Incentive of National Defense Intellectual Property’s Conversion and Application in Weapon Equipment’s R&D Process

In view of the low conversion and application rate (CAAR) of national defense intellectual property (NDIP) and the notable repeated R&D phenomenon in weapon equipment procurement process, effective incentive to promote the CAAR of China’s NDIP is studied from the perspective of evolutionary game. The incentive intensity of NDIP is defined in the form of "giving more R&D opportunities". Based on the duopoly R&D competetion hypothesis and the replicator dynamic model, evolutionary model of the R&D strategy of the two equipment R&D enterprises under certain incentive intensity value is constructed .The incentive intensity of NDIP is defined from the perspective of "giving more R&D opportunities". Analysis of the existence and stability of stationary points shows that there are two critical values of the incentive intensity of NDIP on effecting the evolutionary stable strategy combination of the two competitive R&D enterprises, and the incentive effect is discrepant in different value ranges: (1) when the incentive intensity is lower than the first critical value, incentive is invalid; (2) when incentive intensity lies between the two critical value, given other conditions, the possibility of "applicate NDIP" into an evolutionary stable strategy increases with the increase of incentive intensity; and (3) when the incentive intensity exceeds the second critical value, "applicate NDIP" becomes the only evolutionary stable strategy.