The Effects of Auditor Designation by the Regulator on Auditor Decisions: Evidence from Korea

The Korean market regulator designates external auditors for certain companies that have strong incentives to manage their earnings or that require strict external audits (the auditor designation system [ADS]). The ADS offers an interesting research setting for examining the effects of transferring the power of auditor selection to the regulator. Based on the results of a quasi-experiment with Korean auditors, we find that the ADS may be effective in reducing aggressive client accounting policy choices and achieve greater consensus in a hypothetical impairment loss recognition case. Although more research is needed on the various types of audit engagement systems, the results imply that the ADS may improve audit quality. Thus, auditor designation by the regulator for certain companies that try to manage their earnings (i.e., the ADS) may be a favorable alternative to the current audit engagement system. Data Availability: Data are available from the authors upon request.