远端物理设备指纹

Tadayoshi Kohno, A. Broido, K. Claffy
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引用次数: 790

摘要

我们将介绍远程物理设备指纹识别领域,或对物理设备进行指纹识别,而不是对操作系统或设备类别进行远程指纹识别,并且不需要已知的指纹设备合作。我们通过利用设备硬件中微小的偏差来实现这一目标:时钟偏差。我们的技术不需要对指纹设备进行任何修改。当测量器与指纹设备相距数千英里、多跳和几十毫秒时,以及当指纹设备从不同位置通过不同的访问技术连接到互联网时,我们的技术报告的测量结果是一致的。此外,当指纹设备位于NAT或防火墙之后,以及通过NTP或SNTP维护设备的系统时间时,可以应用我们的被动和半被动技术。人们可以使用我们的技术来获取有关互联网上的两个设备(可能在时间或IP地址上发生了变化)是否实际上是同一个物理设备的信息。示例应用包括:计算机取证;在某种可能性下,跟踪从不同公共接入点连接到互联网的物理设备;计算NAT后的设备数量,即使设备使用恒定或随机的IP ID;远程探测地址块以确定地址是否对应于虚拟主机,例如,作为虚拟蜜网的一部分;匿名化的网络痕迹。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Remote physical device fingerprinting
We introduce the area of remote physical device fingerprinting, or fingerprinting a physical device, as opposed to an operating system or class of devices, remotely, and without the fingerprinted device's known cooperation. We accomplish this goal by exploiting small, microscopic deviations in device hardware: clock skews. Our techniques do not require any modification to the fingerprinted devices. Our techniques report consistent measurements when the measurer is thousands of miles, multiple hops, and tens of milliseconds away from the fingerprinted device, and when the fingerprinted device is connected to the Internet from different locations and via different access technologies. Further one can apply our passive and semi-passive techniques when the fingerprinted device is behind a NAT or firewall, and also when the device's system time is maintained via NTP or SNTP. One can use our techniques to obtain information about whether two devices an the Internet, possibly shifted in time or IP addresses, are actually the same physical device. Example applications include: computer forensics; tracking, with some probability, a physical device as it connects to the Internet from different public access points; counting the number of devices behind a NAT even when the devices use constant or random IP ID; remotely probing a block of addresses to determine if the addresses correspond to virtual hosts, e.g., as part of a virtual honeynet; and unanonymizing anonymized network traces.
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