爬虫是一种道德情感

J. Fischer, Rachel Fredericks
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引用次数: 0

摘要

在道德哲学和道德心理学的文献中,毛骨悚然和毛骨悚然的情感一直被忽视。我们认为,恐惧本身就是一种具有道德意义的情绪,而不仅仅是一种恐惧、厌恶或愤怒(尽管它与这些情绪有共同的特征)。在反思案例时,我们为一种新颖的描述辩护,认为这是对令人毛骨悚然的人的反应。根据我们对道德不敏感的解释,当爬行的对象是对基本道德考虑不敏感的行为活动时,爬行是合适的。当,只有当一个人有这种麻木不仁的倾向时,他才是一个讨厌鬼。这种不敏感,尤其是在极端情况下,引发了人们对爬虫的道德能动性的怀疑。我们区分了多种类型的不敏感,回应了感觉爬行本身是令人反感的担忧,并以与爬行相关的认知问题的讨论结束。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
The Creeps as a Moral Emotion
Creepiness and the emotion of the creeps have been overlooked in the moral philosophy and moral psychology literatures. We argue that the creeps is a morally significant emotion in its own right, and not simply a type of fear, disgust, or anger (though it shares features with those emotions). Reflecting on cases, we defend a novel account of the creeps as felt in response to creepy people. According to our moral insensitivity account, the creeps is fitting just when its object is agential activity that is insensitive to basic moral considerations. When, only when, and insofar as someone is disposed to such insensitivity, they are a creep. Such insensitivity, especially in extreme forms, raises doubts about creeps’ moral agency. We distinguish multiple types of insensitivity, respond to concerns that feeling the creeps is itself objectionable, and conclude with a discussion of epistemic issues relating to the creeps.
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