令人眼花缭乱的吉莱斯皮:平衡方法的夸张死亡和上诉管辖权灵活性的不可避免的诱惑

Bryan D. Lammon
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引用次数: 2

摘要

在吉莱斯皮诉美国钢铁公司案中,最高法院似乎支持一种平衡联邦上诉管辖权的方法,即法院可以在任何案件中权衡中间上诉的成本和收益。但法院很快就否定了这种平衡的做法,今天回避了对上诉管辖权的逐案裁决。因此,普遍的看法是,吉莱斯皮和平衡方法已死。但这种平衡的做法在上诉法院依然存在。在各种情况下,这些法院都依靠平衡的方法来审理上诉。他们建立了基于平衡方法的理论。他们在确定自己的管辖权时采取个案平衡的方式。与普遍的看法相反,平衡的做法在上诉法院仍然存在。平衡方法的持续存在——似乎直接无视最高法院的授权——表明上诉法官在界定其管辖权时无法抗拒行使一些自由裁量权。这种自由裁量权的诱惑对审间上诉文献的主要目标——改革——构成了挑战。如果要进行改革,很可能会采取明确规定的形式。但是,如果平衡方法的坚持所表明的是正确的——如果上诉法官不能完全放弃在界定其管辖权时使用自由裁量权——那就有可能破坏改革可能制定的任何规则的确定性、可预测性和适用的便利性。因此,我建议对中间上诉改革采取一种基本上新颖的办法:将绝对规则和酌情规定结合起来。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Dizzying Gillespie: The Exaggerated Death of the Balancing Approach and the Inescapable Allure of Flexibility in Appellate Jurisdiction
In Gillespie v. U.S. Steel Corp., the Supreme Court appeared to endorse a balancing approach to federal appellate jurisdiction, whereby courts could weigh the costs and benefits of an interlocutory appeal in any case. But the Court soon disavowed the balancing approach and today eschews case-by-case determinations of appellate jurisdiction. The common perception, then, is that Gillespie and the balancing approach are dead. But the balancing approach persists in the Courts of Appeals. In a variety of contexts, these courts have relied on the balancing approach to hear appeals. They’ve constructed doctrines based on the balancing approach. And they engage in case-by-case balancing in determining their jurisdiction. Contrary to popular belief, the balancing approach is alive and well in the Courts of Appeals.The balancing approach’s persistence — seemingly in direct defiance of the Supreme Court’s mandate — suggests that appellate judges cannot resist wielding some discretion when defining their jurisdiction. This allure of discretion poses a challenge to the primary goal of the literature on interlocutory appeals: reform. If reform is to happen, it will likely take the form of categorical rules. But if what the balancing approach’s persistence suggests is true — if appellate judges cannot completely forego using discretion in defining their jurisdiction — that threatens to undermine the certainty, predictability, and ease of application of any rules that reform might develop. I thus propose a largely novel approach to interlocutory appeal reform: a combination of categorical rules and a discretionary catchall.
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