{"title":"评“评估发展成功的秘诀”:发展的制度和政治分析的政策效用","authors":"Philip Keefer","doi":"10.1093/WBRO/LKM008","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In \"Evaluating Recipes for Development Success\" Avinash Dixit criticizes recent efforts to identify the \"fundamental\" causes of development and to distill policy recommendations from these efforts. This comment focuses on the strand of that literature related to institutions and development. Two arguments are important: that the rule of law and the security of property rights are important for growth and that they are the product of political institutions. Professor Dixit argues that identification and other concerns undermine the second argument and inhibit the formulation of policy recommendations. While these concerns are valid, research has begun to disaggregate broad political institutions (democracy and autocracy) and to look at the details of political competition, such as voter information and politician credibility, which are both more robust determinants of political decision-making and more susceptible to policy interventions. Copyright The Author 2007. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / the world bank . All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org, Oxford University Press.","PeriodicalId":47647,"journal":{"name":"World Bank Research Observer","volume":"12 1","pages":"159-164"},"PeriodicalIF":8.7000,"publicationDate":"2007-08-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"3","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Comment on “Evaluating Recipes for Development Success”: The Policy Usefulness of Institutional and Political Analyses of Development\",\"authors\":\"Philip Keefer\",\"doi\":\"10.1093/WBRO/LKM008\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"In \\\"Evaluating Recipes for Development Success\\\" Avinash Dixit criticizes recent efforts to identify the \\\"fundamental\\\" causes of development and to distill policy recommendations from these efforts. This comment focuses on the strand of that literature related to institutions and development. Two arguments are important: that the rule of law and the security of property rights are important for growth and that they are the product of political institutions. Professor Dixit argues that identification and other concerns undermine the second argument and inhibit the formulation of policy recommendations. While these concerns are valid, research has begun to disaggregate broad political institutions (democracy and autocracy) and to look at the details of political competition, such as voter information and politician credibility, which are both more robust determinants of political decision-making and more susceptible to policy interventions. Copyright The Author 2007. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / the world bank . All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org, Oxford University Press.\",\"PeriodicalId\":47647,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"World Bank Research Observer\",\"volume\":\"12 1\",\"pages\":\"159-164\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":8.7000,\"publicationDate\":\"2007-08-24\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"3\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"World Bank Research Observer\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1093/WBRO/LKM008\",\"RegionNum\":1,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"DEVELOPMENT STUDIES\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"World Bank Research Observer","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/WBRO/LKM008","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"DEVELOPMENT STUDIES","Score":null,"Total":0}
Comment on “Evaluating Recipes for Development Success”: The Policy Usefulness of Institutional and Political Analyses of Development
In "Evaluating Recipes for Development Success" Avinash Dixit criticizes recent efforts to identify the "fundamental" causes of development and to distill policy recommendations from these efforts. This comment focuses on the strand of that literature related to institutions and development. Two arguments are important: that the rule of law and the security of property rights are important for growth and that they are the product of political institutions. Professor Dixit argues that identification and other concerns undermine the second argument and inhibit the formulation of policy recommendations. While these concerns are valid, research has begun to disaggregate broad political institutions (democracy and autocracy) and to look at the details of political competition, such as voter information and politician credibility, which are both more robust determinants of political decision-making and more susceptible to policy interventions. Copyright The Author 2007. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / the world bank . All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org, Oxford University Press.
期刊介绍:
The World Bank Journals, including the Research Observer, boast the largest circulation among economics titles. The Research Observer is distributed freely to over 9,100 subscribers in non-OECD countries. Geared towards informing nonspecialist readers about research within and outside the Bank, it covers areas of economics relevant for development policy. Intended for policymakers, project officers, journalists, and educators, its surveys and overviews require only minimal background in economic analysis. Articles are not sent to referees but are assessed and approved by the Editorial Board, including distinguished economists from outside the Bank. The Observer has around 1,500 subscribers in OECD countries and nearly 10,000 subscribers in developing countries.