信息市场,行政决策和预测成本效益分析

IF 1.9 2区 社会学 Q1 LAW
M. Abramowicz
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引用次数: 45

摘要

未来地图是美国国防部高级研究计划局的一个项目,旨在通过实验来确定信息市场是否能改善国防部的决策。信息市场是指从证券价格中获取信息的证券市场,其清算价值取决于未来事件。政府打算利用这样一个市场来评估潜在的政治暗杀的可能性,而这一潜在应用的不安全导致了一场争议,最终导致了该计划的取消。在这篇文章中,Abramowicz教授评估了信息市场在理论上是否对行政机构有用,并得出结论,信息市场可以帮助约束行政机构的预测,但前提是能够克服一些技术障碍,如操纵的危险。由于运作良好的信息市场的预测是客观的,因此它们作为一种工具,在预测任务中显示出许多与成本效益分析为规范性政策评估提供的相同的优点。这两种方法都有助于克服认知错误,阻止利益集团操纵,并约束行政机构的决策。这篇文章建议,这两种形式的分析可以结合起来,产生一种“预测性成本效益分析”。在这种分析中,信息市场将预测在决定是否颁布一项特定政策几年后进行的回顾性成本效益分析的结果。只要最终决策者的身份无法预测,预测成本效益分析就会估计一般决策者将如何评估政策。由于预测性成本效益分析评估不依赖于现任机构官员的身份,因此他们无法掩盖数字,以证明官员出于特殊或意识形态原因而偏好的政策是合理的。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Information Markets, Administrative Decisionmaking, and Predictive Cost-Benefit Analysis
FutureMAP, a project of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, was to involve experiments to determine whether information markets could improve Defense Department decisionmaking. Information markets are securities markets used to derive information from the prices of securities whose liquidation values are contingent on future events. The government intended to use such a market to assess the probabilities of potential political assassinations, and the indelicacy of this potential application contributed to a controversy leading to the cancellation of the program. In this Article, Professor Abramowicz assesses whether information markets in theory could be useful to administrative agencies, and it concludes that information markets could help discipline administrative agency predictions, but only if a number of technical hurdles such as the danger of manipulation can be overcome. Because the predictions of well-functioning information markets are objective, they function as a tool that exhibits many of the same virtues in predictive tasks that cost-benefit analysis offers for normative policy evaluation. Both approaches can help to overcome cognitive errors, thwart interest group manipulation, and discipline administrative agency decisionmaking. The Article suggests that the two forms of analysis might be combined to produce a "predictive cost-benefit analysis." In such an analysis, an information market would predict the outcome of a retrospective cost-benefit analysis, to be conducted some years after the decision whether to enact a particular policy. As long as the identity of the eventual decisionmaker cannot be anticipated, predictive cost-benefit analysis estimates how an average decisionmaker would be expected to evaluate the policy. Because the predictive cost-benefit analysis assessment is not dependent on the identity of current agency officials, they cannot shade the numbers to justify policies that the officials prefer for idiosyncratic or ideological reasons.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
2.40
自引率
5.00%
发文量
2
期刊介绍: The University of Chicago Law Review is a quarterly journal of legal scholarship. Often cited in Supreme Court and other court opinions, as well as in other scholarly works, it is among the most influential journals in the field. Students have full responsibility for editing and publishing the Law Review; they also contribute original scholarship of their own. The Law Review"s editorial board selects all pieces for publication and, with the assistance of staff members, performs substantive and technical edits on each of these pieces prior to publication.
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