基于机器学习的物联网边缘节点安全攻击及对策

Vishalini R. Laguduva, S. A. Islam, Sathyanarayanan N. Aakur, S. Katkoori, Robert Karam
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引用次数: 13

摘要

技术的进步使无处不在的计算设备的高度连接生态系统的发展取得了巨大进展,统称为物联网(IoT)。由于所收集数据的敏感性,确保物联网设备的安全性是重中之重。物理不可克隆功能(puf)已成为确保物联网节点安全的关键硬件原语。由于PUF体系结构固有的随机性,对PUF体系结构进行恶意建模已被证明是困难的。现有的恶意PUF建模方法假设对PUF架构的先验知识和物理访问可用于对物联网节点的恶意攻击。然而,许多物联网网络都假设PUF架构在物理和数学上都是足够防篡改的。在这项工作中,我们表明克隆PUF并不需要了解底层PUF结构。我们提出了一种新颖的非侵入性,架构独立的机器学习攻击,用于强PUF设计,克隆精度为93.5%,比另一种两阶段蛮力攻击模型提高了48.31%。我们还提出了一种基于机器学习的对策——鉴别器,它可以区分克隆PUF设备和真实PUF设备,平均准确率为96.01%。所提出的鉴别器可用于从云服务器远程快速认证数百万个物联网节点。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Machine Learning Based IoT Edge Node Security Attack and Countermeasures
Advances in technology have enabled tremendous progress in the development of a highly connected ecosystem of ubiquitous computing devices collectively called the Internet of Things (IoT). Ensuring the security of IoT devices is a high priority due to the sensitive nature of the collected data. Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) have emerged as critical hardware primitive for ensuring the security of IoT nodes. Malicious modeling of PUF architectures has proven to be difficult due to the inherently stochastic nature of PUF architectures. Extant approaches to malicious PUF modeling assume that a priori knowledge and physical access to the PUF architecture is available for malicious attack on the IoT node. However, many IoT networks make the underlying assumption that the PUF architecture is sufficiently tamper-proof, both physically and mathematically. In this work, we show that knowledge of the underlying PUF structure is not necessary to clone a PUF. We present a novel non-invasive, architecture independent, machine learning attack for strong PUF designs with a cloning accuracy of 93.5% and improvements of up to 48.31% over an alternative, two-stage brute force attack model. We also propose a machine-learning based countermeasure, discriminator, which can distinguish cloned PUF devices and authentic PUFs with an average accuracy of 96.01%. The proposed discriminator can be used for rapidly authenticating millions of IoT nodes remotely from the cloud server.
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