过去告诉未来:耐用品市场的历史价格

Manag. Sci. Pub Date : 2022-03-08 DOI:10.1287/mnsc.2022.4309
Zheng Gong, Jin-wu Huang, Yuxin Chen
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引用次数: 1

摘要

我们研究历史价格信息(例如,通过价格跟踪器获取)如何影响消费者的购买决策,从而影响企业的动态定价策略。我们首先表明,当不同口味的消费者不了解历史价格时,垄断者在大多数时间内收取较高的常规价格,并定期进行低价销售。然后,我们考虑一小部分消费者(如价格跟踪器用户)了解历史价格的情况。在新均衡下,垄断者降低常规价格并提前销售,这意味着更短的价格周期,更频繁的销售,以及价格跟踪用户的信息优势对其他不知情消费者的积极溢出效应。最后,我们讨论了价格追踪器对企业的影响以及该模型的其他相关管理含义。这篇论文被市场部的Dmitri Kuksov接受。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
What the Past Tells About the Future: Historical Prices in the Durable Goods Market
We investigate how historical price information (e.g., accessed through price trackers) influences consumers’ purchase decisions and thus affects a firm’s dynamic pricing strategy. We first show that when consumers with heterogeneous tastes are not informed about historical prices, the monopolist charges a high regular price for most of the time and periodically holds low-price sales. Then we consider the case in which a small fraction of consumers (such as price tracker users) become informed of historical prices. At the new equilibrium, the monopolist lowers the regular price and advances sales, implying shorter price cycles, more frequent sales, and a positive spillover effect of price tracker users’ informational advantage on the rest of uninformed consumers. We conclude with a discussion of the impact of price trackers on firms and other relevant managerial implications of the model. This paper was accepted by Dmitri Kuksov, marketing.
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