{"title":"参与和发展阿达·阿加达的哲学:道德责任,创造和邪恶的问题","authors":"L. Cordeiro‐Rodrigues","doi":"10.1017/s0034412523000513","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"\n In a recent article in Religious Studies, Ada Agada argues that the problem of evil is relevant not only to those who consider God to hold the Omni-properties but also to those who understand God as a limited deity. He rightly points out that the limited-God literature in the African philosophy of religion has neglected to address the problem of evil by too quickly dismissing it. Agada then argues that the reason why the problem of evil is philosophically relevant for the limited-God view is that He, as the creator, has sufficient powers to address evil and, thereby, moral responsibility regarding the evil in the world. In this reply, I uphold that although Agada is correct to affirm that the problem of evil is relevant for the limited-God view, he is mistaken to contend that the reason is that God is the creator. I contest this view and argue that Agada has not given enough reasons to believe that God has moral responsibility over evil in the world. However, I illuminate how Agada can develop this argument in the future.","PeriodicalId":45888,"journal":{"name":"RELIGIOUS STUDIES","volume":"26 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5000,"publicationDate":"2023-06-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Engaging and developing Ada Agada's philosophy: moral responsibility, creation, and the problem of evil\",\"authors\":\"L. Cordeiro‐Rodrigues\",\"doi\":\"10.1017/s0034412523000513\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"\\n In a recent article in Religious Studies, Ada Agada argues that the problem of evil is relevant not only to those who consider God to hold the Omni-properties but also to those who understand God as a limited deity. He rightly points out that the limited-God literature in the African philosophy of religion has neglected to address the problem of evil by too quickly dismissing it. Agada then argues that the reason why the problem of evil is philosophically relevant for the limited-God view is that He, as the creator, has sufficient powers to address evil and, thereby, moral responsibility regarding the evil in the world. In this reply, I uphold that although Agada is correct to affirm that the problem of evil is relevant for the limited-God view, he is mistaken to contend that the reason is that God is the creator. I contest this view and argue that Agada has not given enough reasons to believe that God has moral responsibility over evil in the world. However, I illuminate how Agada can develop this argument in the future.\",\"PeriodicalId\":45888,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"RELIGIOUS STUDIES\",\"volume\":\"26 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.5000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-06-29\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"RELIGIOUS STUDIES\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1095\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0034412523000513\",\"RegionNum\":2,\"RegionCategory\":\"哲学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"0\",\"JCRName\":\"RELIGION\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"RELIGIOUS STUDIES","FirstCategoryId":"1095","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0034412523000513","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"RELIGION","Score":null,"Total":0}
Engaging and developing Ada Agada's philosophy: moral responsibility, creation, and the problem of evil
In a recent article in Religious Studies, Ada Agada argues that the problem of evil is relevant not only to those who consider God to hold the Omni-properties but also to those who understand God as a limited deity. He rightly points out that the limited-God literature in the African philosophy of religion has neglected to address the problem of evil by too quickly dismissing it. Agada then argues that the reason why the problem of evil is philosophically relevant for the limited-God view is that He, as the creator, has sufficient powers to address evil and, thereby, moral responsibility regarding the evil in the world. In this reply, I uphold that although Agada is correct to affirm that the problem of evil is relevant for the limited-God view, he is mistaken to contend that the reason is that God is the creator. I contest this view and argue that Agada has not given enough reasons to believe that God has moral responsibility over evil in the world. However, I illuminate how Agada can develop this argument in the future.
期刊介绍:
Religious Studies is an international journal devoted to the problems of the philosophy of religion as they arise out of classical and contemporary discussions and from varied religious traditions. More than 25 articles are published each year, and the journal also contains an extensive book review section.