小农生产者保险和风险管理方案

IF 8.7 1区 经济学 Q1 DEVELOPMENT STUDIES
V. Smith
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引用次数: 19

摘要

许多小农家庭的收入和获得粮食的机会极有可能出现灾难性的减少。因此,在过去十年中,决策者和经济学家越来越多地关注扩大这些家庭可用的风险管理战略的潜在机制。商业提供的以天气为基础的指数保险产品(可能部分由补贴提供资金)特别令人感兴趣,因为它们显然有可能在小农家庭最需要帮助的时候向他们提供赔偿。然而,来自广泛研究的经验证据表明,如果没有相对可观的补贴,小农不会购买商业定价的指数产品,甚至不会购买与农场作物损失挂钩的“全风险”产品。之所以会出现这种情况,有三个重要原因。首先,小农已经有许多管理风险的方法,包括非正式的社区倡议、农场生产决策和农场外工作。其次,指数保险计划面临相当大的基差风险;家庭在农场遭受重大作物损失时,往往得不到指数保险赔偿。第三,向小农户提供农作物保险的固定成本使得此类保险成本高昂。因此,天气指数保险的潜在市场可能仅限于为相对较大的农民群体提供直接或间接的保险,通过向小额信贷和其他贷款机构提供与重大干旱等灾难性事件相关的广泛贷款违约的保险。或者,天气指数可以简单地用于更准确地确定紧急援助的目标。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Producer Insurance and Risk Management Options for Smallholder Farmers
Many smallholder families are exceptionally prone to potentially catastrophic decreases in their incomes and access to food. Over the past decade, therefore, policy makers and economists have increasingly focused on potential mechanisms for expanding risk management strategies available to those families. Commercially provided weather-based index insurance products, perhaps partially funded by subsidies, have been of particular interest because of their apparent potential to provide payments to smallholder families when they are most in need of help. However, the empirical evidence from a wide range of studies indicates that, absent relatively substantial subsidies, small holder farmers will not purchase commercially priced index products or even "all risk" products where payments are tied to the farm's crop losses. There are three important reasons why this is the case. First, smallholder farmers already have many ways of managing their risks, including informal community-based initiatives, on-farm production decisions and off-farm work. Second, index insurance schemes are subject to considerable basis risk; families often do not receive an index insurance indemnity when they experience a substantial crop loss on their farms. Third, the fixed costs of delivering crop insurance to smallholders make such coverage expensive. The potential market for weather index insurance therefore may be limited to insuring relatively large groups of farmers, either directly or indirectly though providing micro finance and other lending institution with coverage against widespread loan defaults associated with catastrophic events like major droughts. Alternatively, weather indexes could simply be used to more accurately target emergency aid.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
12.60
自引率
1.20%
发文量
8
期刊介绍: The World Bank Journals, including the Research Observer, boast the largest circulation among economics titles. The Research Observer is distributed freely to over 9,100 subscribers in non-OECD countries. Geared towards informing nonspecialist readers about research within and outside the Bank, it covers areas of economics relevant for development policy. Intended for policymakers, project officers, journalists, and educators, its surveys and overviews require only minimal background in economic analysis. Articles are not sent to referees but are assessed and approved by the Editorial Board, including distinguished economists from outside the Bank. The Observer has around 1,500 subscribers in OECD countries and nearly 10,000 subscribers in developing countries.
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