安曼证券交易所上市工业公司ceo薪酬对成本粘性的影响

Lina Fuad Murwih Hussien
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引用次数: 1

摘要

本研究的目的是分析成本行为(成本粘性)的不对称性,并确定ceo薪酬对成本粘性行为程度的影响。研究对象为在日月光交易所上市的公众持股公司,共56家工业公司。数据收集自(2009 - 2019)期间(35)家工业公司。为了衡量成本粘性的程度,我们使用了Weiss(2010)的模型。Weiss(2010)的模型考虑了公司最后四个季度的成本和活动水平(销售)的变化,Weiss(2010)模型构建了成本变化的对数比率的差异。研究发现,约旦工业企业CEO的薪酬包括两种形式。这些公司支付固定工资或与业绩挂钩的奖金。研究发现,支付给首席执行官的薪酬形式会影响管理者的行为。结果表明,绩效奖励伴随着成本粘性水平的降低,而固定工资形式的薪酬伴随着成本粘性水平的提高。研究报告建议,公司应了解薪酬形式在行政决定中的作用,特别是在资源修改方面,因为必须考虑到与资源修改有关的管理动机,因为它们对公司的成本结构有明确和直接的影响。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
The Impact of CEOs' Compensations on Cost Stickiness in Industrial Companies Listed on the Amman Stock Exchange
The purpose of this study is to analyze the asymmetry in cost behavior (cost stickiness) and to identify the impact of CEOs' compensation on the degree of cost stickiness behavior. The study population consists of the public shareholding companies listed on the ASE, which number (56) industrial company. Data were collected from (35) industrial companies for the period (2009 - 2019). To measure the degree of costs stickiness, The Model of Weiss (2010) was used. The Model of Weiss (2010) takes into account the costs and changes in the level of activity (sales) for the last four quarters of the company, Weiss (2010) model constructs the difference in logarithmic ratios of changes in cost. The study found that the CEO's compensation in Jordanian industrial companies consists of two forms. The companies pay fixed salaries or performance-related bonuses. The study found that the form of compensation that is paid to the CEO affects the behavior of managers. The results indicated that the performance-related rewards are accompanied by a decrease in the level of cost stickiness, and the compensation paid in the form of fixed salaries are accompanied by a high level of cost stickiness. The study recommends that companies should understand the role of the compensation form in administrative decisions, especially with regard to resource modifications, as management motives in relation to resource modifications must be taken into account because of their clear and direct impact on the cost structure of companies.
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