将真实市场参与者的真实偏好带入实验室:一个改变沃顿商学院课程分配机制的实验

National Bureau of Economic Research Pub Date : 2016-07-01 DOI:10.3386/w22448

Eric Budish, Judd B. Kessler

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引用次数: 19

摘要

本文报告了一种新的市场设计的实验测试，这种设计在理论上是有吸引力的，但却做出了普遍的、可能不切实际的假设:€œagents报告它们的类型;也就是说，市场参与者可以完美地向机制报告他们的偏好。对偏好报告的关注导致了一种新颖的实验设计，将真实的市场参与者的真实偏好引入实验室，而不是像市场设计中典型的那样赋予实验对象人为的偏好。实验发现，市场参与者能够充分地报告他们的偏好€œaccurately足够的，以实现机制的效率和公平利益，即使偏好报告错误会有意地损害机制的绩效。[工作文件22448]

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Bringing Real Market Participants' Real Preferences into the Lab: An Experiment that Changed the Course Allocation Mechanism at Wharton

This paper reports on an experimental test of a new market design that is attractive in theory but makes the common and potentially unrealistic assumption that â€œagents report their typeâ€ ; that is, that market participants can perfectly report their preferences to the mechanism. Concerns about preference reporting led to a novel experimental design that brought real market participantsâ€™ real preferences into the lab, as opposed to endowing experimental subjects with artificial preferences as is typical in market design. The experiment found that market participants were able to report their preferences â€œaccurately enoughâ€ to realize efficiency and fairness benefits of the mechanism even while preference-reporting mistakes meaningfully harmed mechanism performance. [Working Paper 22448]

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National Bureau of Economic Research

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