昂贵的屏幕和专利审查

IF 3 1区 社会学 Q1 LAW
J. Masur
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引用次数: 9

摘要

美国专利商标局因效率低下和效率低下而获得了当之无愧的声誉。因此,改革专利局的建议集中在提高专利审查质量的同时降低其成本。然而,这种观点忽视了与获得专利相关的高成本所发挥的有价值的作用:这些成本是对抗低价值专利的有效屏障。此外,由于专利价值的不对称,昂贵的屏幕可能会以不成比例的数量选择对社会有害的专利。尽管专利局是进行这种昂贵筛选的最重要的机构,但它并不是唯一的机构。在其他各种情况下,管理流程的私人成本可能会补充流程本身,以筛选不需要的参与者。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Costly Screens and Patent Examination
The United States Patent and Trademark Office has acquired a well-deserved reputation for inefficacy and inefficiency. Proposals for reforming the patent office have thus focused on improving the quality of patent review while decreasing its cost. Yet this view overlooks the valuable function performed by the high costs associated with obtaining a patent: these costs serve as an effective screen against low-value patents. Moreover, due to asymmetries in patent values, the costly screen is likely to select against socially harmful patents in disproportionate numbers. Although the patent office is the most prominent forum in which this type of costly screening operates, it is not the only one. In a variety of other contexts, the private costs of navigating an administrative process may complement the process itself in screening out unwanted participants.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
4.10
自引率
0.00%
发文量
3
审稿时长
16 weeks
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