{"title":"“第二次或连续的”人身保护申请和Panetti诉Quarterman案后的迟滞索赔","authors":"K. Reynolds","doi":"10.2307/20141868","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 19961 (AEDPA) provides that, except in narrow circumstances, \"second or successive\" petitions for writs of habeas corpus must be dismissed.2 Some valid constitutional claims, however, do not become ripe until after the prisoner has been convicted and sentenced, and perhaps af ter one habeas petition has been presented and denied on the merits. AEDPA's \"gatekeeping\" provisions-codified at 28 USC ? 2244(b) have the potential to foreclose review of meritorious constitutional claims, and a division in the circuit courts has developed over their interpretation. One set of courts takes a \"liberal\" approach, focusing on pre-AEDPA common law principles and erring on the side of al lowing claims. Another set takes a more rigorous textual and struc tural tack, which is appealing on an interpretive level but has the po tential to prevent judicial review of constitutional violations. The Su preme Court has recently addressed a limited aspect of this question, and it applied the liberal approach with a pragmatist flourish. All of these approaches suffer from serious shortcomings, and this Comment argues that the textual interpretation should be followed except in certain circumstances in which that interpretation would foreclose review of a possible constitutional violation. In this scenario, courts should invoke the canon of constitutional avoidance to prevent violat ing the underlying constitutional right that the prisoner seeks to vindi cate through a writ of habeas corpus. In short, this Comment focuses on a very particular question, but one that could be of great import. Imagine a prisoner petitions a fed eral court for a writ of habeas corpus, and the petition is duly adjudi cated on the merits. If she files again, this time including a claim that was unripe at the time of the earlier petition and thus not included, must the chronologically second petition be dismissed as \"second or","PeriodicalId":51436,"journal":{"name":"University of Chicago Law Review","volume":"65 Supplement 1","pages":"10"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9000,"publicationDate":"2007-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"\\\"Second or Successive\\\" Habeas Petitions and Late-Ripening Claims after Panetti v Quarterman\",\"authors\":\"K. Reynolds\",\"doi\":\"10.2307/20141868\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 19961 (AEDPA) provides that, except in narrow circumstances, \\\"second or successive\\\" petitions for writs of habeas corpus must be dismissed.2 Some valid constitutional claims, however, do not become ripe until after the prisoner has been convicted and sentenced, and perhaps af ter one habeas petition has been presented and denied on the merits. AEDPA's \\\"gatekeeping\\\" provisions-codified at 28 USC ? 2244(b) have the potential to foreclose review of meritorious constitutional claims, and a division in the circuit courts has developed over their interpretation. One set of courts takes a \\\"liberal\\\" approach, focusing on pre-AEDPA common law principles and erring on the side of al lowing claims. Another set takes a more rigorous textual and struc tural tack, which is appealing on an interpretive level but has the po tential to prevent judicial review of constitutional violations. The Su preme Court has recently addressed a limited aspect of this question, and it applied the liberal approach with a pragmatist flourish. All of these approaches suffer from serious shortcomings, and this Comment argues that the textual interpretation should be followed except in certain circumstances in which that interpretation would foreclose review of a possible constitutional violation. In this scenario, courts should invoke the canon of constitutional avoidance to prevent violat ing the underlying constitutional right that the prisoner seeks to vindi cate through a writ of habeas corpus. In short, this Comment focuses on a very particular question, but one that could be of great import. Imagine a prisoner petitions a fed eral court for a writ of habeas corpus, and the petition is duly adjudi cated on the merits. If she files again, this time including a claim that was unripe at the time of the earlier petition and thus not included, must the chronologically second petition be dismissed as \\\"second or\",\"PeriodicalId\":51436,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"University of Chicago Law Review\",\"volume\":\"65 Supplement 1\",\"pages\":\"10\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.9000,\"publicationDate\":\"2007-10-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"University of Chicago Law Review\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"90\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2307/20141868\",\"RegionNum\":2,\"RegionCategory\":\"社会学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"LAW\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"University of Chicago Law Review","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2307/20141868","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"LAW","Score":null,"Total":0}
"Second or Successive" Habeas Petitions and Late-Ripening Claims after Panetti v Quarterman
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 19961 (AEDPA) provides that, except in narrow circumstances, "second or successive" petitions for writs of habeas corpus must be dismissed.2 Some valid constitutional claims, however, do not become ripe until after the prisoner has been convicted and sentenced, and perhaps af ter one habeas petition has been presented and denied on the merits. AEDPA's "gatekeeping" provisions-codified at 28 USC ? 2244(b) have the potential to foreclose review of meritorious constitutional claims, and a division in the circuit courts has developed over their interpretation. One set of courts takes a "liberal" approach, focusing on pre-AEDPA common law principles and erring on the side of al lowing claims. Another set takes a more rigorous textual and struc tural tack, which is appealing on an interpretive level but has the po tential to prevent judicial review of constitutional violations. The Su preme Court has recently addressed a limited aspect of this question, and it applied the liberal approach with a pragmatist flourish. All of these approaches suffer from serious shortcomings, and this Comment argues that the textual interpretation should be followed except in certain circumstances in which that interpretation would foreclose review of a possible constitutional violation. In this scenario, courts should invoke the canon of constitutional avoidance to prevent violat ing the underlying constitutional right that the prisoner seeks to vindi cate through a writ of habeas corpus. In short, this Comment focuses on a very particular question, but one that could be of great import. Imagine a prisoner petitions a fed eral court for a writ of habeas corpus, and the petition is duly adjudi cated on the merits. If she files again, this time including a claim that was unripe at the time of the earlier petition and thus not included, must the chronologically second petition be dismissed as "second or
期刊介绍:
The University of Chicago Law Review is a quarterly journal of legal scholarship. Often cited in Supreme Court and other court opinions, as well as in other scholarly works, it is among the most influential journals in the field. Students have full responsibility for editing and publishing the Law Review; they also contribute original scholarship of their own. The Law Review"s editorial board selects all pieces for publication and, with the assistance of staff members, performs substantive and technical edits on each of these pieces prior to publication.