反思起诉史禁止反悔

IF 1.9 2区 社会学 Q1 LAW
D. Lichtman
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引用次数: 95

摘要

在诉讼历史禁止反悔规则下,专利申请人在专利审查过程中修改其权利要求承担了重大风险:即,法院随后将这些变化解释为应被解读为限制专利范围的让步的风险。这种风险因强有力的证据假设而加剧,在这种假设下,法院假定,除非专利权人提出足够的证据,否则,每一个变化都会触发禁止反悔,而由此产生的禁止反悔丧失了除修订后的语言字面描述之外的一切。这些假设的理由是,以这种方式实施,起诉历史禁止反言使专利范围更可预测。在这篇文章中,我认为这种好处的代价太高了。根据对专利审查的大量实证研究,我表明,由于这些证据假设,禁止反言对专利审查员之间的差异和技术类别之间的差异非常敏感,这是危险的。也就是说,禁止反言以不同的方式对待类似的申请,不是因为在优点上的差异,而是因为所涉及的审查员的个人特征以及所讨论的技术类型固有的差异。我认为,一个更好的规则是,通过逆转目前的证据假设,从而将审查员和技术差异的重要性降到最低,从而只有在有明确证据表明申请人和审查员有意放弃给定的覆盖范围时才承认禁止反悔。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Rethinking Prosecution History Estoppel
Under the rule of prosecution history estoppel, patent applicants who amend their claims during the course of patent prosecution assume a significant risk: namely, the risk that a court will later construe the changes as concessions that should be read to limit patent scope. This risk is exacerbated by strong evidentiary presumptions under which courts are to assume, unless the patentee presents sufficient evidence otherwise, that every change triggers estoppel, and that the resulting estoppel forfeits everything except that which the revised language literally describes. The justification for these presumptions is that, implemented in this fashion, prosecution history estoppel makes patent scope more predictable. In this Article, I argue that the benefit comes at too high a price. Drawing on a large empirical study of patent prosecution, I show that, because of these evidentiary presumptions, estoppel is dangerously sensitive to differences between patent examiners and differences across technology categories. That is, estoppel treats similar applications in dissimilar ways, not because of differences on the merits, but instead because of the personal characteristics of the examiners involved and because of differences inherent to the types of technology at issue. A better rule, I argue, would minimize the significance of examiner and technology disparities by reversing the current evidentiary presumptions and thus recognizing estoppel only where there is clear evidence that the applicant and the examiner intended to forfeit a given scope of coverage.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
2.40
自引率
5.00%
发文量
2
期刊介绍: The University of Chicago Law Review is a quarterly journal of legal scholarship. Often cited in Supreme Court and other court opinions, as well as in other scholarly works, it is among the most influential journals in the field. Students have full responsibility for editing and publishing the Law Review; they also contribute original scholarship of their own. The Law Review"s editorial board selects all pieces for publication and, with the assistance of staff members, performs substantive and technical edits on each of these pieces prior to publication.
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