E. Bellini, David Gérault, J. Grados, R. Makarim, Thomas Peyrin
{"title":"用MILP增强ChaCha7的微分线性密码分析","authors":"E. Bellini, David Gérault, J. Grados, R. Makarim, Thomas Peyrin","doi":"10.46586/tosc.v2023.i2.189-223","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we present an improved differential-linear cryptanalysis of the ChaCha stream cipher. Our main contributions are new differential-linear distinguishers that we were able to build thanks to the following improvements: a) we considered a larger search space, including 2-bit differences (besides 1-bit differences) for the difference at the beginning of the differential part of the differential-linear trail; b) a better choice of mask between the differential and linear parts; c) a carefully crafted MILP tool that finds linear trails with higher correlation for the linear part. We eventually obtain a new distinguisher for ChaCha reduced to 7 rounds that requires 2166.89 computations, improving the previous record (ASIACRYPT 2022) by a factor of 247. Also, we obtain a distinguisher for ChaCha reduced to 7.5 rounds that requires 2251.4 computations, being the first time of a distinguisher against ChaCha reduced to 7.5 rounds. Using our MILP tool, we also found a 5-round differential-linear distinguisher. When combined with the probabilistic neutral bits (PNB) framework, we obtain a key-recovery attack on ChaCha reduced to 7 rounds with a computational complexity of 2206.8, improving by a factor 214.2 upon the recent result published at EUROCRYPT 2022.","PeriodicalId":37077,"journal":{"name":"IACR Transactions on Symmetric Cryptology","volume":"109 1","pages":"189-223"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7000,"publicationDate":"2023-06-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Boosting Differential-Linear Cryptanalysis of ChaCha7 with MILP\",\"authors\":\"E. Bellini, David Gérault, J. Grados, R. Makarim, Thomas Peyrin\",\"doi\":\"10.46586/tosc.v2023.i2.189-223\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"In this paper, we present an improved differential-linear cryptanalysis of the ChaCha stream cipher. Our main contributions are new differential-linear distinguishers that we were able to build thanks to the following improvements: a) we considered a larger search space, including 2-bit differences (besides 1-bit differences) for the difference at the beginning of the differential part of the differential-linear trail; b) a better choice of mask between the differential and linear parts; c) a carefully crafted MILP tool that finds linear trails with higher correlation for the linear part. We eventually obtain a new distinguisher for ChaCha reduced to 7 rounds that requires 2166.89 computations, improving the previous record (ASIACRYPT 2022) by a factor of 247. Also, we obtain a distinguisher for ChaCha reduced to 7.5 rounds that requires 2251.4 computations, being the first time of a distinguisher against ChaCha reduced to 7.5 rounds. Using our MILP tool, we also found a 5-round differential-linear distinguisher. When combined with the probabilistic neutral bits (PNB) framework, we obtain a key-recovery attack on ChaCha reduced to 7 rounds with a computational complexity of 2206.8, improving by a factor 214.2 upon the recent result published at EUROCRYPT 2022.\",\"PeriodicalId\":37077,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"IACR Transactions on Symmetric Cryptology\",\"volume\":\"109 1\",\"pages\":\"189-223\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.7000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-06-16\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"IACR Transactions on Symmetric Cryptology\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.46586/tosc.v2023.i2.189-223\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q3\",\"JCRName\":\"COMPUTER SCIENCE, SOFTWARE ENGINEERING\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"IACR Transactions on Symmetric Cryptology","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.46586/tosc.v2023.i2.189-223","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"COMPUTER SCIENCE, SOFTWARE ENGINEERING","Score":null,"Total":0}
Boosting Differential-Linear Cryptanalysis of ChaCha7 with MILP
In this paper, we present an improved differential-linear cryptanalysis of the ChaCha stream cipher. Our main contributions are new differential-linear distinguishers that we were able to build thanks to the following improvements: a) we considered a larger search space, including 2-bit differences (besides 1-bit differences) for the difference at the beginning of the differential part of the differential-linear trail; b) a better choice of mask between the differential and linear parts; c) a carefully crafted MILP tool that finds linear trails with higher correlation for the linear part. We eventually obtain a new distinguisher for ChaCha reduced to 7 rounds that requires 2166.89 computations, improving the previous record (ASIACRYPT 2022) by a factor of 247. Also, we obtain a distinguisher for ChaCha reduced to 7.5 rounds that requires 2251.4 computations, being the first time of a distinguisher against ChaCha reduced to 7.5 rounds. Using our MILP tool, we also found a 5-round differential-linear distinguisher. When combined with the probabilistic neutral bits (PNB) framework, we obtain a key-recovery attack on ChaCha reduced to 7 rounds with a computational complexity of 2206.8, improving by a factor 214.2 upon the recent result published at EUROCRYPT 2022.